Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
PROGRAM 1.
Outline of the course, methods and assessment
2.
Environmental Policies: Foundations and design 2.1. Environmental problems 2.2. Market failure 2.3. Conventional and economic approaches to regulation
3.
Economic mechanisms for environmental policies (mostly environmental taxes)
4.
Regulation in practice (mostly environmental taxes)
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
5.
Systemic applications: Green Tax Reforms (GTR)
6.
The Spanish case: positive and normative analysis 6.1. Methods for analysis 6.2. Simulations
7.
Taxing tourism…
8.
My Conclusions
9.
TERESA PALMER: Environmental instruments in the tourism sector (end of March)
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
My Objectives from now on: a) Show you the academic and practical relevance of economic instruments (especially taxes) for environmental policies. b) Enumerate and describe the methods for economic, distributional and environmental evaluation of policies to protect the environment. c) Show you some results on the use of such methods in hypothetical Spanish applications d) Beginning of May: How all this applies to tourism?
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
1. Foundations of environmental taxes ● Definition ● The first dividend a) a corrective rationale ● Cost-efficient properties a) static b) dynamic ● The second dividend a) a fiscal rationale
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
2. Some specific applications ● A first taxonomy Revenues= (Tax Base * tax rate) - Deductions a) emissions vs. product taxes b) efficient vs. cost-effective taxes c) earmarked vs non-earmarked taxes ● Effects a) environmental (prices) b) revenues c) distributional d) other 5
Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
● Experiences a) general vision b) Swedish taxes on NOx, SO2 and CO2 emissions c) the Dutch water pollution tax d) waste taxes in Denmark and the United Kingdom e) energy and transport taxation - quantitative aspects - qualitative aspects - tax differentiation
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
b) Swedish taxes on NOx, SO2 and CO2 emissions - NOx: high tax rate, direct measurement, return related to output and remarkable incentive effects - SO2: trend to tax products, large incentives, non-earmarked - CO2: use in GTR, with competitiveness pressures and a reduction of 10% wrt BAU, change in energy consumption patterns
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
c) Dutch tax on water pollution - mixed emission-product tax (direct discharges and water consumption), earmarked source to fund water sanitation, important incentive effects, over-allocation of resources to sanitation d) waste taxes - Denmark: important reduction of non-recyclable waste (-26% between 1998 and 1987), especially of non-organic waste - UK: a similar behaviour and use in GTR
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
e) energy and transport taxes - quantitative relevance - growing use with environmental purposes: - tax differentiation (leaded and unleaded petrol) - the British escalator (1993-1998)
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
3. Systemic applications: green tax reforms ● Design and experiences a) the hybrid-extensive tax reform model b) theoretical foundations c) usual solutions d) most relevant applications ● Effects a) environmental b) a double dividend?
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
A TYPICAL GREEN TAX REFORM
Revenue Reduction
Fall in upper marginal tax rates of income taxes
Fall in social security contributions
R E V E N U E
N E U T R A L I T Y
(Second Dividend)
Revenue Increase
Excise taxes become more environmentally aware and show increases
New environmental taxes
(First Dividend)
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
4. The Spanish case: positive and normative analysis ● The real context a) scarce interest of regional and local governments b) the role of regional governments c) main applications d) effects e) climate change policies?
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
● Regional environmental taxes? a) Perfect Correspondence (Oates, 1972) and environmental goods b) Spatial divergence of preferences and environmental problems (Peltzman and Tideman, 1972) € DMS1
DMS2
t1
t2
CDM2 CDM1
E1
Emisión
E2
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
c) Access and management of information (Tietenberg, 1974)
d) Destructive competition? (Cumberland, 1981; Oates and Schwab, 1988)
e) Some applications in the OECD (2001)
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
Taxes on fuels
Germany Austria Canada Netherlands N. Zealand Portugal Switzerland Japan
R, L R
Taxes on vehicles
Waste taxes
Water pollution taxes
R R L L L L
R R
L
R,L
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
● Spanish regional environmental taxes: general vision a) water taxes b) air pollution taxes c) taxes on facilities d) taxes on energy products e) waste taxes f) taxes on dangerous solid emissions
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira Water pollution taxes Andalucía
Air pollution taxes
Taxes on facilities
Waste tax
2003
Aragón
1997
Asturias
1994
Baleares
1991
Tax on dangerous waste 2003
1991 i
Canarias Cantabria
Energy taxes
1986 2002*
Castilla-L Castilla-M
2002*
Cataluña
1981
C. Valenciana
1992
2000
2000
2000 2003
Extremadura
1997
Galicia
1993
La Rioja
1994
Madrid
1984
Murcia
2000
Navarra
1989
1995
1995*
1995*
País Vasco
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
2 2
Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
R e c a u d a c i ó n p r e s u p u e s ta d a 2 0 0 4 p o r c a d a 1 . 0 0 0 h a b (€ )
Regional Tax Revenues (€/1.000 hab)
ma
h
t re
nc -L a
Ca
st i
lla
Ex
Ma
An
Va C.
du
ra
ía lu c da
rc i
a cia le n
Ba
Mu
na
res le a
ia s tur As
ón ag
ta l u Ca
Ar
ña
ja R io La
va Na
Ga
lic
ia
r ra
50.000 45.000 40.000 35.000 30.000 25.000 20.000 15.000 10.000 5.000 0
CCAA Canon de saneamiento Impuesto emisiones Depósito residuos Vertidos aguas litorales Instalaciones / actividades que inciden en el medio ambiente
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
● General revenue data in 2002 Regional own tax receipts (2.5% of total regional taxes) Million €
%
Water pollution taxes
477.5
49.9
Taxes on fossil fuels (Canary Is)
252.4
26.3
Gambling
149.4
15.6
58
6.0
Other
20.2
2.2
TOTAL
958
100.0
Remaining environmental
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
● Water pollution taxes
a) objective b) tax base c) tax rate d) tax administration
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
Fixed rate Aragón
X X
Galicia Murcia
industrial
X
Navarra
pollution
X
X
population
consumption
minimum consumption
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
La Rioja Valencia
unique
monthly
X
Cataluña Madrid
residential/
X
Asturias Baleares
Variable rate
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
An example Water pollution tax in Valencia
Industrial use
fix rate
variable rate
(€ year)
(€/m )
De 53.46 a 1,870.17
0.261
3
Residential use (wrt population) less than 500
0
0
500-3,000
11.48
0.113
3,000-10,000
15.61
0.147
10,000-100,000
19.31
0.182
more than 100,000
21.70
0.216
(fixed rate is determined by the size of measurement devices)
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
● Air pollution taxes a) objective b) tax base c) tax rate d) effects
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
The Galician tax on air pollution ● Design and implementation a) Legal object: In theory environmental correction...
b) Tax base: Emission of Oxides of Nitrogen and Sulphur, through direct or indirect estimation
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Environmental Policy Tools
Xavier Labandeira
● Design and implementation c) Tax rates: 0-1000 ton/year 1000.1-40000 ton/year 40000.1-80000 ton/year more than 80000 ton/year
0€/ton 33€/ton 36€/ton 42€/ton
d) Revenues: Earmarked to environmental protection and to a special regional fund to deal with environmental catastrophes
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Environmental Policy Tools
Xavier Labandeira
Year
Thousand €
Evolution
1996
12945
100.0
1997
13171
101.7
1998
14849
114.7
1999
15151
117.0
2000
13662
105.2
2001
13090
101.1
2002
15583
120.4
2003
15443
119.3
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Environmental Policy Tools
Xavier Labandeira
Emissions in 2000 SO2 Andalucía
NOx
CO2
Population
7,236,459
132
199
39,864
(8.4)
(14.1)
(14.3)
(18.2)
251
71
13,965
1,183,234
(16.0)
(5.0)
(5.0)
(3.0)
184
178
31,058
2,484,603
(11.8)
(12.7)
(11.1)
(6.2)
91
89
16,857
1,716,152
(5.8)
(6.4)
(6.0)
(4.3)
96
165
37,257
6,147,610
(6.2)
(11.7)
(13.4)
(15.4)
465
116
27,971
2,724,544
(29.8)
(8.3)
(10.0)
(6.8)
25
79
18,555
5,091,336
(% on total)
(1.6)
(5.6)
(6.7)
(12.8)
TOTAL
1563
1406
278,634
39,852,651
(% on total) Aragón
(% on total) Castilla-L
(% on total) Castilla-M
(% on total) Cataluña
(% on total) Galicia
(% on total) Madrid
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
● Taxes on facilities and energy products a) objective b) tax base c) tax rates
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
● Taxes on deposit and on the stock of dangerous waste a) objective b) tax base c) tax rate
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
● Waste taxes a) objective b) tax base c) tax rate
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Methods for Analysis (1)
enfoques de equilibrio parcial modelos tecnológicos modelos económicos agregados microeconométricos Unable to study the double dividend hypotheses
Methods for Analysis (2) enfoques de equilibrio general macroeconométricos
modelos de equilibrio general aplicados estático dinámico
nº simulaciones
Simulations on GTRs and Results 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0
159 130 115 99 60
54 39
15
15
Positivo o nulo Empleo
Negativo PIB
Total Bienestar
% de simulaciones
Range of results 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 ( , - 2 .5 ] ( - 2 .5 , - 1 .5 ]
( - 1 .5 , - 0 .5 ]
e m p le o
( - 0 .5 , +0 .5 ]
( +0 .5 , +1 .5 ]
( +1 .5 , +2 .5 ]
P IB
b ie n e s ta r
( +2 .5 , )
nº simulaciones
Macroeconometric models 100 90 80 70 60
88
86
77 64
50 40 30 20 10 0
22 11
P o s it ivo o n u lo
N e g a t ivo E m p le o
To t a l P IB
Applied General Equilibrium models (static) 33
35 nº simulaciones
30 25
22
20 15
11 8
10 5
1
5
3
1
0
0 Positivo o nulo
Negativo
Empleo
PIB
Total Bienestar
Applied General Equilibrium models (dynamic) 70
65
nº simulaciones
60 50 40
41
37
33
32
30
10
21
17
20 4
4
0 P ositivo o nulo E m pleo
Negativo P IB
Total B ienestar
Recycling through lump sum transfers 30 23 22
nº simulaciones
25
26
24
20 15 10 5
4
5
4 1
1
0 P os itivo o nulo
Negativo
E m pleo
P IB
Total B ienes tar
nº simulaciones
Reducing SS contributions by firms 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
95
93
87 76
5 P os itivo o nulo E m pleo
11 2
11
6
Negativo P IB
Total B ienes tar
GTR without recycling 23
nº simulaciones
25 19
20 13
15 11
10
10
8 4
5
2
2
0 P os itivo o nulo
Negativo
E m pleo
P IB
Total B ienes tar
Change in CO2 emissions 35
frecuencia %
30 25 20 15 10 5 0 ( , -20%]
(-20%, -15%] (-15%, -10%] (-10%, -5%]
reducción estimada
(-5%, 0]
(0, +5%]
Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
4.3. Simulations for Spain
a) why and what for? b) methods - input-output - applied general equilibrium - microeconomic demand c) main results - environmental effectiveness - distribution - revenues - growth and employment
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
a) Our progression -Partial equilibrium (SO2 tax) -Partial equilibrium+Input-output (CO2 tax) -General equilibrium -General equilibrium+micro disaggregation b) Our main interest: climate change - hypothetical green tax reform - carbon emission trading c) Future tasks: - Disaggregate more the electricity sector - Integration of the Spanish market - Dynamics
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.
A Spanish Household Demand System to Assess the Effects of Energy Price Changes Xavier Labandeira*, José M. Labeaga^ and Miguel Rodríguez*
*rede and Universidade de Vigo, Spain ^ UNED, Spain
4 9
MOTIVATION
1º. Behaviour of Spanish CO2 emisions since 1990: • + 35% at the end of 2002.
• Spanish international commitments: no more than +15% by 2010.
2º. European Commission proposals to increase energy taxes:
• (1992) ECOTAX: tax mix on energy consumption and CO2 emissions. • (1997) Energy Tax Harmonization: increasing some Spanish energy taxes.
GOAL
• To estimate a energy demand system with microeconomic data for Spain.
• To simulate both reforms in Spanish energy taxation for 1995: • effects in domestic energy consumption. • income distribution. • emissions of pollutants.
CONTRIBUTION
We estimate a household energy demand system for Spain by the firsrt time.
We do analyse the effects of different energy policies.
The energy demand system was estimated taking third order moving averages.
LITERATURE
Baker, P., Blundell, R. W. y Micklewright, J. (1989)
Labandeira, X. y Labeaga, J. M. (1999)
THEORETICAL MODEL: quadatric extension proposed by Banks and others (1997) of Deaton and Muellbauer’s Almost Ideal Demand Model (1980):
w iht = α i +
N
∑γ j =1
ij
log p jht
x ht λi + β i log + a ( p ht ) b ( p ht
⎛ x ht ⎜⎜ log )⎝ a ( p ht
⎞ ⎟ ) ⎟⎠
2
wiht
is the participation of good i in total expenditure by household h at moment t
piht
price vector faced by each household at each moment in time
xht
real income for each household, deflated by a Stone price index
Stone price index:
log p ht =
∑w j =1
jht
p jt
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
We use the Spanish Family Expenditure Survey (1985-1995)
We estimate simultaneously the various equations that make up the demand system. One of the equations needs to be left out of the estimation to avoid multicolineality. Its parameters will be obtained using the additivity restrictions.
the presence of a censored dependent variable, makes it necessary to use alternative estimation methods to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
We impose symmetry and zero degree homogeneity conditions on prices and income, to be coherent with consumer theory.
EMPIRICAL MODEL
We use the Spanish Family Expenditure Survey (1985-1995) Given the high percent of zero records due to infrequency in quarterly spending: 9 We do not estimate either solid and liquid fuel demand equations nor collective central heating expenditure. They are aggregated to other non-durable goods expenditure. 9 We take third order moving averages on demand equations instead of estimating it directly. We use different dummy variables to explain the heterogeneity in the energy profile of Spanish households.
RESULTS FROM DEMAND SYSTEM ESTIMATION The place of residence is a very important variable for the choice of energy sources consumed by households. Living in a city or rural area makes a difference because of: ¾ The oportunities to get access to different energy sources: 9 Natural Gas: it is consumed in big minicipalities. 9 LPG: it is mainly consumed in councils < 50.000 inhab. ¾ The transport needs: 9 There is a progressive substitution of private transport (fuels) for public transport as population size of the municipality increases.
Liquefied Petroleum Gases (LPG) : Butane and Propane.
Household composition is another very important determinant of energy spending, specialy for transport spending:
¾ Each household member aged ≥ 16 increase the share of private transport expenditure (fuels) and public transport expenditure.
¾ In homes where the head of the household is aged > 60, the share of private transport is lower (-61,55%), and the share of public transport is greater (17,84%), than those where the head of the household is aged < 40.
SIMULATION METHODOLOGY
Any change in tax rates is shifted completely on to retail prices. The new participation of energy goods in total expenditure is the sum of the values predicted by simulation plus the share prediction error:
wi
1
= ε
i
(
G 1 + wˆ i p
1 j
, X
1
)
The share prediction error includes the part of each proportion not explained by the relative prices, the actual expenditure or the error term. It includes, therefore, the heterogeneity of households in the sample, and unobservable fixed effects.
SIMULATED REFORMS
Reform A: taxes on energy products are defined on the basis of a pure tax on Carbon emissions. The tax rate is equivalent to 45 euros per ton of Carbon .
Reform B: the tax reform is built upon the draft of the European Commission Directive for energy taxation harmonization.
Table 1. Tax rates before and after the simulated reforms
Prereform
Reform A
%
Reform B
%
Electricity
0.160
0.260
+ 62.5
0.210
+ 31.2
Natural/Mains gas
0.160
0.300
+ 87.5
0.230
+ 43.7
LPG
0.070
0.200
+ 185.7
0.070
+ 0.0
Car fuels
0.670
0.820
+ 21.0
1.070
+ 57.9
Public transport
0.070
0.100
+ 42.9
0.100
+ 42.9
Food and beverages
0.060
0.069
+ 14.4
0.060
+ 0.0
Other non-durables
0.112
0.116
+ 3.6
0.112
+ 0.0
Liquefied Petroleum Gases (LPG) : Butane and Propane.
Table 2. Tax revenue by group of goods (euros) and increase (%)
Pre-reforma [en%]
Reforma A
Reforma B
Electricity
115,277,763 [2.4]
+ 36.1
+ 24.8
Natural/mains gas
13,599,701 [0.3]
+ 90.4
+ 78.1
LPG
14,657,417 [0.3]
+ 149.1
- 9.5
715,839,734 [14.9]
+ 23.1
+ 55.0
46,966,486 [1.0]
+ 51.7
+ 63.5
Food and beverages
609,072,879 [12.7]
+ 14.6
- 1.3
Other non-durables
3,277,511,990 [ 68.4]
+ 2.4
- 2.0
Total
4,792,925,971 [100]
+ 9.0
+ 8.5
Car fuels Public transport
HOW TO USE TAX REVENUES RAISED BY REFORMS ?
9 They would be employed to increase public spending (absolute tax incidence analysis).
9 Equal lump-sum transfers to taxpayers, in proportion to income (differential tax incidence analysis). 9 Green Tax Reform with transfers to taxpayers emulating the Spanish 1999 tax reform on income taxes (differential tax incidence analysis).
Table 2. Revenue recicling of tax reforms Decil
Lump Sum
1999 Spanish income tax rate reform
1º
10%
0,5%
2º
10%
1,7%
3º
10%
4,2%
4º
10%
7,3%
5º
10%
9,7%
6º
10%
10,9%
7º
10%
10,9%
8º
10%
12,1%
9º
10%
13,4%
10º
10%
29,3%
Total
100%
100%
Table 4. Distributional effects by taxpayer. Average tax payments per cent increases w.r.t. pre-reform by decile. REFORM A Decile
REFORM B
No recycling
Lump sum
Income Tax reduction
No recycling
Lump sum
Income Tax reduction
1
+ 11.8%
- 24.7%
+ 10.0%
+ 6.5%
- 27.8%
+ 4.8%
2
+ 10.7%
- 10.8%
+ 7.0%
+ 8.0%
- 12.3%
+ 4.5%
3
+ 10.1%
- 6.4%
+ 3.2%
+ 8.1%
- 7.4%
+ 1.5%
4
+ 10.1%
- 3.2%
+ 0.4%
+ 8.9%
- 3.6%
- 0.2%
5
+ 9.9%
- 1.3%
- 1.0%
+ 9.2%
- 1.4%
- 1.0%
6
+ 9.2%
- 0.4%
- 1.2%
+ 8.7%
- 0.4%
- 1.2%
7
+ 9.2%
+ 0.8%
+ 0.1%
+ 8.6%
+ 0.8%
+ 0.0%
8
+ 8.8%
+ 1.9%
+ 0.4%
+ 9.1%
+ 2.6%
+ 1.2%
9
+ 8.5%
+ 2.8%
+ 0.8%
+ 8.5%
+ 3.1%
+ 1.2%
10
+ 7.8%
+ 4.1%
- 3.0%
+ 8.9%
+ 4.6%
- 2.1%
Table 5. Distributional effects of tax reforms without revenue recycling by groups of taxpayers. Average tax payments (euros) and % increases w.r.t. pre-reform.
Group
Reform B
Reform A
Retired
29.93
+ 9.42%
25.16
+ 7.93%
No Children
32.64
+ 8.94%
29.22
+ 8.00%
2 Children
42.07
+ 9.03%
41.73
+ 8.95%
4 Children
35.53
+ 10.04%
32.32
+ 9.14%
Rural
32.81
+ 9.59%
30.64
+ 8.96%
City
36.63
+ 8.70%
34.53
+ 8.20%
Average
36.29
+ 9.01%
34.33
+ 8.53%
Table 6. Environmental effects of reforms in % change of emissions
CO2
SO2
Ref. A
Ref. B
Electricity
-16,25%
-4,87%
Natural Gas
+1,54%
+23,93%
LPG
-12,81%
-9,54%
Car fuels
+1,74%
-1,72%
Total
-5,53%
-2,54%
Electricity: SO2 intensive
Ref. A
Ref. B
-14,69%
-4,60%
Car fuels: NOx intensive
NOx Ref. A
-1,72%
Ref. B
-2,33%
CONCLUSIONS and POLICY RECOMENDATIONS
9
Carbon taxes are very effective to reduce emissions
9
The gains in revenues are sizeable and similar for both reforms
9
The tax burden distribution on the population is somewhat worrying
9
Some recycling packages may offset such negative effects on distribution
g a s to o r ig in a l
m e d ia m ó v il # 3
40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 3 A9
T4
4 A9
T1
4 A9
T2
4 A9
T3
A9
4T
4 A9
5T
1 A9
5T
2 A9
5T
3 A9
5T
4 A9
6T
1
.
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain
Xavier Labandeira and Miguel Rodríguez
rede and Department of Applied Economics Universidade de Vigo, Spain www.rede.uvigo.es
6 9
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain
MOTIVATION ¾ EU should decrease GHG emission by a 8% in the year 2012 with respect to emission levels in 1990 following the Kyoto protocol. ¾ The distribution of emissions from the european buble was very positive for Spain allowing an increase up to a maximum of 15% between 1990-2012. ¾ However the important economic growth in the last years together with the lack of political initiatives has stimulated a strong increase in the consumption of energy. ¾ At the end of 2002 Spanish GHG emissions were a 40% greater than in 1990.
7 0
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain
THE EUROPEAN MARKET FOR CARBON EMISSIONS PERMITS ¾ In 2005 the EU will create a market for carbon emission permits. This gas represents about 80% of GHG. ¾ In 2004 each country has to approve the national assignment of permits. ¾ The carbon market includes only some industrial sectors: electricity generation, refinery of petrol, iron and steel, cement and lime, glass, tile and brick, pulp and paper. ¾ They represent less than 50% of total GHG emissions. ¾ National plans against GHG should include some complementary measures to ensure the efficiency of environmental policies: energy efficiency policies or green taxes for instance.
7 1
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain
GOAL OF THE PAPER A first step for the analysis of the effects from the Spanish national plan against GHG emissions between 2005-2012. CONTRIBUTION To increase the short amount of empirical evidence for Spain: rede research group: • Micro: Labandeira and Labeaga (1999), Labandeira, Labeaga and Rodriguez (2004a). • Micro-Macro: Labandeira, Labeaga and Rodriguez (2004b). Other papers: • Macro: Manresa and Sancho (2004), inapropriate to simulate environmental policies.
These papers analyse ad-hoc environmental policies. 7 2
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain
THE MODEL A standard static general equilibrium model for a small open economy 17 sectors, 5 institutions from ESA-95 (a representative household, public sector, foreign sector, non-profit household-serving institutions, corporations). There is perfect competition in the economy. We use nested CES functions for production and utility. For instance total supply of goods and services in the economy A is a combination of domestic production B and imports from different origins IMP as follows:
⎛ Ai = λi ⎜⎜ bi Bi ⎜ ⎝
σ iA −1 σ iA
+ (1 − bi ) IMPi
σ iA −1 σ iA
σ iA ⎞ σ iA −1
⎟ ⎟⎟ ⎠
We use Armington assumption that foreign goods are imperfect substitutes for domestic produced goods. 7 3
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain
THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION
Production
Value added & energy
Value added
Non-energy goods
Energy
Electricity
Labour
Primary energy products
Capital
Coal Hydrocarbons
Natural gas
Refined oil products
7 4
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain
¾ The production function was specially designed to simulate environmental policies by disaggregating the demand of different energy goods. ¾ This design gives enough flexibility to the firms: 9 To react to energy policies. 9 To substitute between different energy goods. ¾ A more aggregated model will estimate greater costs for the same environmental policy because of the lack of substitution possibilities between energy goods.
7 5
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain
¾ The public sector collects direct taxes (income and labour taxes) and indirect taxes (production and consumption taxes). ¾ There is a competitive labour market (no unemployment) ¾ The representative household maximize utility W by allocating a fixed endowment of time between leisure LS and labour supply, subject to the budget constraint.
⎛ W = ⎜ sUB LS ⎜ ⎝
σ UB −1 σ UB
σ UB σ UB −1 σ UB −1 σ UB
+ (1 − sUB )UA
⎞ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠
UA is a composite good made up by consumption goods and savings.
7 6
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain
UTILITY FUNCTION
Welfare
Consumption
Leisure
Savings Final Consumption Non-energy goods
Energy for the House Petrol
Electricity
Primary energy products Coal Natural gas Refined oil products
7 7
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain
THE ENVIRONMENTAL MODEL ¾ It simulates carbon emissions from consumption of fossil fuels {coal, natural gas and oil products} from all sectors and institutions in the economy. ¾ Therefore there are not direct emissions from consumption of electricity for instance. THE DATA ¾ We built a new 1995 national accounting matrix which includes also environmental data for Spain . ¾ The model is calibrated in order to replicate the data as an optimum equilibrium. ¾ Elasticities of substitution have not been calibrated but taken from literature. ¾ The wage elasticity of labour supply was taken from econometric estimates for Spain.
7 8
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain
SIMULATIONS The Spanish national plan against GHG emissions: a maximum limit in 2012 equal to +24% more than in the year 1990. Which are the implications of this goal? 9 To reduce GHG emissions by a 16% from current emission levels. 9 To reduce GHG emissions by an annual rate equal to 2%. The paper analyse a reduction of Spanish emissions in the range [-16%, -2%]. We consider the introduction of a tax on carbon emissions. It represents one of the possible complementary measures for sectors out of the carbon market. Therefore we simulate a carbon tax over all sectors in the economy. Revenues are get back to the households by lump-sum transfers subject to the constraint that public expenditures must remain constant in real terms.
7 9
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain (First and Second Conclusions) 9 A convex relationship between emissions abatement and effects on GDP and prices. 9 Reduction on emissons under 6% have no significative effects on GDP and prices. 9 A 16% reduction on emissions will have significative effects on GDP and prices.
change (%)
GDP
inflation
2 1,5 1 0,5 0 -0,5 -1 -1,5 -2 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8
-6
-4
-2
change (%) on CO2 emissions
8 0
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain (Third Conclusion) There are negative effects on the demand for labour but by a lower amount: 9 At the firm level: substitution between energy and labour. 9 At the macro level: changes on the industrial composition of the economy in favor of less energy intensive and labour intensive sectors. % GDP
change (%)
-16
-14
-12
% employment
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0 -0,2 -0,4 -0,6 -0,8 -1 -1,2 -1,4 -1,6 -1,8 change (%) on CO2 emissions
8 1
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain (Fourth Conclusion) 9 The effects on welfare are not significative. 9 There is a strong non-linear relationship between changes on emissions and welfare. 9 These results are similar to those found in the literature for Spain.
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0 E V (% )
-0,02 -0,04 -0,06 -0,08 -0,1 change (%) on CO2 emissions
8 2
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain Sectoral effects of a 2% reduction on carbon emissions. (annual reduction between 2005-2012 to achieve Kyoto)
9 Negative effects on the activity of energy sectors: coal, natural gas and oil products. 9 No significative effects on electricity: generation with coal, petrol and natural gas represent less than 50% of total production. SERV 2 TRANSP HOT-REST SERV 1 CONSTRUC METAL MINERAL CHEMICAL MANUF FOOD GAS ELEC REFINED MINER OIL COAL AGRI -4,5
-4,0
-3,5
-3,0
-2,5
-2,0
(%) CO2 emissions
-1,5
-1,0
-0,5
0,0
(%) production
8 3
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain Sectoral effects of a 2% reduction on carbon emissions. (annual reduction between 2005-2012 to achieve Kyoto)
9 No significative effects on the activity of non-energy sectors: electricity represents about 70% of final consumption of energy in Spain. 9 All sectors reduce carbon emissions by more than 1%. SERV 2 TRANSP HOT-REST SERV 1 CONSTRUC METAL MINERAL CHEMICAL MANUF FOOD GAS ELEC REFINED MINER OIL COAL AGRI -4,5
-4,0
-3,5
-3,0
-2,5
(%) CO2 emissions
-2,0
-1,5
-1,0
(%) production
-0,5
0,0
8 4
The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain CONCLUSIONS Spain has to reduce carbon emissions by a 16% in 2012 with respect to current levels. That means a 2% annual reduction on GHG emissions between 2005-2012. The are not significative costs from this plan (GDP, competitiveness, employment, welfare). POLICY IMPLICATIONS More delays in the application of these policies will have significative costs for the economy: 9 In the best scenario, a sudden reduction (16%) in carbon emissions in the short time will have important costs in terms of economic growth. 9 The situation would be even worst if Spain increases the consumption of energy in the future. The environmental policy should include cost-efficient measures like a hybrid system combining green taxes and the market for pollution permits to ensure the efficiency of the environmental policy and to minimize costs. 8 5
.
Prices and Markets in Spanish Climate Policies
Xavier Labandeira and Miguel Rodríguez
rede and Department of Applied Economics Universidade de Vigo, Spain www.rede.uvigo.es
8 6
Motivation
¾ The Kyoto protocol for reducing GreenHouse Gas emissions (GHG) has been ratified by the EU. It is now in force after ratification by Russia.
¾ EU should decrease GHG emission by a 8% in the year 2012 with respect to emission levels in 1990. ¾ Spanish GHG emissions behaviour since 1990: 9 increased around 50% in mid 2005 9 EU limit for Spain: +15% by the year 2012 ¾ Since 2005 there is a new market for CO2 pollution permits in EU. This gas represents about 80% of GHG. 8 7
The European Market For Pollution Permits (I)
¾ The EU market will be set up in two phases: 2005-2007: a transition period for testing the market, only CO2. 2008-2012: main reductions on GHG. ¾ Only some industries will trade in this market: electricity generation, oil refinement, iron and steel, cement, lime, glass, ceramics, brick and tile, paper and paper pulp.
¾ They represent about 40% of Spanish emissions. ¾ Permits will be allocated by free among sectors (grandfathering).
8 8
The European Market For Pollution Permits (II)
The rationale for such a market can be found in three reasons: 9 Small polluters (households or small firms) would incur in high transaction costs (information, time, etc). 9 There would be high administrative and monitoring costs for the government to enforce the environmental regulation by small polluters. 9 To reduce opposition and lobbying activities as in the past (e.g. rejection of the European carbon-energy tax in the 90’s).
8 9
The European Market For Pollution Permits (III)
¾ Normative evaluation: 9 It represents an unfair regulation of CO2 emissions because emitters that account for as much as 60% of them are excluded from the pollution market. 9 It is an inefficient approach, as total abatement costs may not be minimized. 9 There is no recycling effect. Revenues from the instrument cannot be employed to reduce pre-existing distorting taxes (double dividend). ¾ Therefore the government should implement some complementary policies like environmental taxes: a “hybrid” regulation system
9 0
. Goal of the paper To analyze the costs for Spain of the European pollution market. To show the efficiency costs from the limited scope for such a market.
Contribution of the paper Despite the troublesome situation of Spain, this is is the first empirical work that addresses this issue for Spain with a general equilibrium model.
Related Papers Labandeira, Labeaga and Rodriguez (2005): microeconomic energy demand
model for the Spanish households: Distributional effects at a micro level. Labandeira, Labeaga and Rodriguez (2005): micro-macro integrated model
9 1
. A static general equilibrium model A standard general equibrium model for a small open economy 17 sectors, a representative household, public sector, foreign sector. There is a competitive labour market (no unemployment) The household maximize utility by allocating a fixed endowment of time between leisure and labour The model was specially designed to simulate environmental policies by modelling the supply and demand of different energy products Environmental model: CO2 from coal, natural gas, oil products. Data: We build a new 1995 national accounting matrix for Spain. 9 2
Figure 1.
Production technology structure chain
Output
Non-Energy Goods
KLE
Energy
Value Added
Primary Energy
Coal
Electricity
K
L
Hydrocarbons
Natural Gas
Refined Oil Products
9 3
Figure 2. Chained household consumption function structure
W elfare
Leisure
Consumption
Final Consumption
Petrol for Private Transport
Savings
Energy for the House
Electricity
Non-Energy Goods
Primary Energy
Coal
Natural Gas
Refined Oil Products
9 4
Simulated policies
Real Market as it is contained in the Spanish National Plan (NAP) on GHG: 9 grandfathering allocation of permits. 9 reduction by a 16% in each Directive sector. Wide Market includes all sectors. Thus we can analyse the efficiency costs of
the real market (the new sectors represent more than 50% of GHG) Auctioned Market simulates the wide market but now the permits will be
auctioned: 9 with lump sum transfers to the households (by keeping public expenditure
constant in real terms). 9 under some theoretical conditions this scenario is equivalent to a tax on
CO2 emissions with no GTR. Policy restriction: the same reduction in CO2 emissions among scenarios.
9 5
Macroeconomic effects of pollution markets
CO2 emissions
Number permits GDP Consumer Price Index (CPI) Welfare
Real Market
Wide Market
Auctioned Market
- 5.63 %
- 5.63 %
- 5.63 %
- 16 %
- 7.62 %
- 7.84 %
- 0.0645 %
- 0.0235 %
- 0.0981 %
+ 0.1 %
+ 0.1 %
0%
- 0.047 %
- 0.027 %
- 0.19 %
9 6
Macroeconomic effects of pollution markets
Real Market
Wide Market
Auctioned Market
- 16 %
- 16 %
- 16 %
Number permits
- 44.5 %
- 21.7 %
- 22.2 %
GDP
- 0.71 %
- 0.42 %
- 0.64 %
Consumer Price Index (CPI)
+ 0.2 %
+ 0.2 %
0%
Welfare
- 0.35 %
- 0.34 %
- 0.65 %
CO2 emissions
9 7
Real Market
Sectoral effects on emissions and production (%) SERV 2 TRANSP HOT-REST SERV 1 CONSTRUC METAL MINERAL CHEMICAL MANUF FOOD GAS ELEC REFINED MINER OIL COAL AGRI -16 -15 -14 -13 -12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 emissions (%)
production (%)
9 8
Wide Market
Sectoral effects on emissions and production (%) SER V 2 TR AN SP H OT-R EST SER V 1 C ON STR U C METAL MIN ER AL C H EMIC AL MAN U F FOOD GAS ELEC R EFIN ED MIN ER OIL C OAL AGR I -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 emissions (%) production (%)
9 9
Auctioned Market
Sectoral effects on emissions and production (%) SERV 2 TRANSP HOT-REST SERV 1 CONSTRUC METAL MINERAL CHEMICAL MANUF FOOD GAS ELEC REFINED MINER OIL COAL AGRI -16 -15 -14 -13 -12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 emissions (%)
production (%)
1 0
Conclusions The costs of pollution market in Spain are of little significance.
The energy sectors are the most affected by the environmental regulation. The losses in activity in the remaining non-energy sectors are of little significance.
There are efficiency costs from the Real Market to be launched in 2005.
Grandfathering allocation of permits ensures a better performance of the Spanish economy as compared to auctioned permits when revenues are given back to the households through lump sum transfers.
1 0
Policy Recommendations
Our results corroborates the fears expressed by industrial sectors on carbon taxes as they raise revenues whatever is the level of emissions.
Empirical evidence in the literature concludes that green tax reforms perform better that grandfathering allocation of permits.
It is advisable to introduce a hybrid system: 9 The European emission trade system for some specific industrial sectors (Directive). 9 Environmental taxes on non Directive sectors and institutions through green fiscal reforms (by reducing other distorting taxes).
1 0
The Effects of a Green Tax Reform in Spain. A New Analytical Approach Integrating Micro and Macroeconomic Models.
Labandeira X., Labeaga* J.M., Rodríguez M.
Dept. Applied Economics, Universidade de Vigo, Spain * Dept. Economic Analysis, UNED, Spain
MOTIVATION ¾ In 2005 the EU wil create a market for CO2 pollution permits. ¾ EU should decrease CO2 emission by a 8% in the year 2010 with respect to emission levels in 1990 following the kyoto protocol. ¾ Spanish CO2 emissions behaviour since 1990: 9 increased by +35% at the end of 2002 9 EU limit for Spain: +15% by the year 2010 ¾ Spanish industries that will trade in this market represents only 40% of spanish emission. ¾ The government will have to implement some complementary policies like environmental taxes.
Goal: to analyse the effects of a green tax reform in Spain on efficiency and distributional grounds
Contribution: a new methodology which integrates a general equilibrium model and a household energy demand system for Spain
A static general equilibrium model
A standard general equibrium model for a small economy 17 sectors, 5 institutions from ESA-95 (a representative household, public sector, foreing sector, non-profit household-serving institutions, corporations). There is a competitive labour market (no unemployment) The household maximize utility by allocating a fixed endowment of time between leisure and labour The model was specially designed to simulate environmental policies by modelling the supply and demand of different energy products Environmental model: CO2 from coal, natural gas, oil products. Data: We build a new 1995 national accounting matrix for Spain.
Production function Production
Value aded & energy
Value aded
Non-energy goods
Energy
Electricity
Labour
Primary energy products
Capital
Coal Hydrocarbons
Natural gas
Refined oil products
Utility function
Welfare
Leisure
Consumption
Final consumption Petrol
Savings
Non-energy goods Energy for the house Natural gas
coal
Refined oil products
Micro model: quadratric extension proposed by Banks and others (1997) of
Deaton and Muellbauer’s Almost Ideal Demand Model (1980):
w iht = α i +
N
∑γ j =1
ij
log p jht
x ht λi + β i log + a ( p ht ) b ( p ht
⎛ x ht ⎜⎜ log )⎝ a ( p ht
⎞ ⎟ ) ⎟⎠
2
wiht
is the participation of good i in total expenditure by household h at moment t
piht
price vector faced by each household at moment t
xht
real income for each household at moment t, deflated by a Stone price index
MICRO MODEL Goods: electricity, natural gas, LPG (propane and butane), petrol for
transport, public transport, food and non-alcoholic drinks, other non durable goods.
Data base: Spanish Family Expenditure Survey (1973, 1980, 1985-95)
We impose symmetry and zero degree homogeneity conditions on prices and income, to be coherent with consumer theory.
Simulated policy
Green tax reform:
•
environmental tax rate equal to 12’28€/ton CO2
•
reduction on firm payroll taxes
Policy restriction: constant real public expenditure
Macroeconomic effects of the green tax reform
• CO2 emissions: • payroll tax rates paid by the firms:
-7.68% -12%
• GDP (producer prices):
- 0.72%
• GDP (comsumer prices):
+ 0.16%
• employment:
+ 0.10%
Sectoral effects on emissions and production (%) SERV 2 TRANSP HOT-REST SERV 1 CONSTRUC METAL MINERAL CHEMICAL MANUF FOOD GAS ELEC REFINED MINER OIL COAL AGRI -16 -15 -14 -13 -12 -11 -10
-9
-8
-7
-6
CO2 emissions
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
production
Changes on relative prices with respect to CPI and average expending (%) Prices
Average spending
Electricity
+ 3.3
+ 2.5
Natural gas
+ 16.1
+ 6.1
LPG
+ 16.1
+ 16
Motor fuels
+ 19.6
+ 17.7
Public transport
+ 0.4
- 3.6
Food and drink
- 0.65
- 2.5
Other non-durable
- 0.89
- 0.6
Note: Estimation for 1995.
Distributional effects by decile (income level). Absolute and relative changes on average tax payments.
euros
%
Decile 1
+ 5.4
+ 0.9
Decile 2
+ 20.4
+ 2.2
Decile 3
+ 32.7
+ 2.8
Decile 4
+ 56.7
+ 3.8
Decile 5
+ 66.2
+ 3.7
Decile 6
+ 76.7
+ 3.8
Decile 7
+ 95.5
+ 4.0
Decile 8
+ 110.6
+ 4.0
Decile 9
+ 134.3
+ 4.0
Decile 10
+ 217.9
+ 4.3
Note: Estimation for 1995.
Distributional effects by household groups. Absolute and relative changes on average tax payments.
Family group
euros
%
Retired
+ 48.5
+ 3.0%
No children
+ 71.1
+ 3.5%
2 children
+ 95.9
+ 4.1%
4 children
+ 76.1
+ 4.2%
Rural
+ 71.2
+ 3.9%
Urban
+ 87.6
+ 3.7%
Number of winners
793
26%
Number of losers
2138
74%
Welfare effects by decile (income level). Absolute EV gains and percentage (%) w.r.t. total expenditure. euros
%
Decile 1
+ 60
+ 1.2
Decile 2
+ 82
+ 1.1
Decile 3
+ 96
+1
Decile 4
+ 107
+ 0.95
Decile 5
+ 119
+ 0.91
Decile 6
+ 132
+ 0.88
Decile 7
+ 146
+ 0.85
Decile 8
+ 162
+ 0.82
Decile 9
+ 183
+ 0.76
Decile 10
+ 238
+ 0.68
Welfare effects by household groups. Absolute EV gains and percentage (%) w.r.t. total expenditure.
Family group
euros
%
Retired
+ 131
+ 1%
No children
+ 133
+ 0.90%
2 children
+ 125
+ 0.74%
4 children
+ 130
+ 0.71%
Rural
+ 119
+ 0.88%
Urban
+ 144
+ 0.83%
Changes on household emissions w.r.t. pre-reform (%)
CO2
SO2
NOx
Electricity
- 0.8%
--
--
Natural gas
- 8.6%
--
--
LPG
- 0.1%
--
--
Motor oils
- 1.6%
--
--
Total
-1.5%
-0.8%
-1.5%
Dividends from the green tax reform 1st dividend: + 221 mill. euros 2nd dividend: + 35 mill. Euros
NOTE: we consider that a ton of CO2 causes a social damage equal to 12,28€ (green tax rate)
Conclusions 9 We have used a new methodology which allow us to perform a
complete analysis of the effects of public policies 9 We have probed that a green tax reform in Spain will produce a double
dividend with no distributional costs. 9 These results may be a good proxy for other Mediterranean countries 9 In distributional grounds results may be different in Northern European
countries
Tourism taxation: an applied analysis for Spain Alberto Gago Xavier Labandeira Fidel Picos Miguel Rodríguez rede and Departamento Economía Aplicada, Universidade de Vigo www.rede.uvigo.es
1 2
Tourism taxation: an applied analysis for Spain Motivación • El turismo representa en torno a un 10% del PIB y la inversión mundial, por lo que cualquier reforma fiscal que afecte al sector puede tener importantes efectos sobre la economía en su conjunto. • La actividad turística es un candidato natural a soportar impuestos específicos, debido a los costes convencionales y externos que el turismo puede generar, y a una posible escasa incidencia de gravarlo.
Objetivos • Analizar los fundamentos de la imposición sobre el turismo. • Estudiar la experiencia española. • Simular y analizar, mediante un modelo de equilibrio general, los efectos de posibles reformas fiscales que afecten específicamente a la actividad turística en España.
1 2
Tourism taxation: an applied analysis for Spain Objetivos y fundamentos de la imposición sobre el turismo • Objetivos de reforma fiscal (recaudación) ¾ ¾
Base imponible tradicionalmente inelástica. Exportabilidad del impuesto (nacional o regional)
• Cobertura de costes convencionales. ¾
Posibilidad de sobrecoste de las mayores infraestructuras necesarias para acoger a los turistas.
• Internalización de costes externos. ¾
Costes ambientales y de congestión.
Principal problema: no es posible gravar el turismo aisladamente, sino sólo ciertos productos y servicios consumidos habitualmente, pero no en exclusiva, por los turistas.
1 2
Tourism taxation: an applied analysis for Spain Imposición turística en España • Impuesto sobre Estancias en Empresas Turísticas de Alojamiento (Islas Baleares, 2001-2003) ¾
Gravaba cada estancia en establecimiento hotelero o similar con una cantidad fija en función de la categoría (entre 0,25 y 2 euros por noche)
¾
Recaudación afectada a gastos ambientales.
¾
Derogada en octubre de 2003.
• Impuesto sobre la Circulación de Vehículos de Arrendamiento sin Conductor (Islas Baleares, Ley 13/2005) ¾
Grava la circulación de automóviles de alquiler.
¾
Parte fija: entre 1,5 y 5 euros/día
¾
Parte variable: entre 0,1 y 0,3 euros/km
¾
La recaudación no está afectada a gastos ambientales.
1 2
Tourism taxation: an applied analysis for Spain Metodología para la simulación de reformas fiscales en España • Modelo de equilibrio general estático para una pequeña economía abierta. • Un hogar representativo, 17 sectores económicos, sector público y sector exterior (incluye turismo) • Mercado de trabajo competitivo y sin desempleo. • Los hogares maximizan su utilidad asignando una dotación fija de tiempo entre ocio y trabajo. • El modelo ha sido especialmente diseñado para simular políticas fiscales y ambientales, proporcionando resultados de producción y empleo tanto en términos globales como desagregados. • Datos: se construyen una nueva matriz de contabilidad nacional de 1995 para España.
1 2
Tourism taxation: an applied analysis for Spain
Impuestos turísticos simulados 1.
2.
Impuesto sobre alojamientos turísticos. •
Impuesto ad valorem (10%) sobre pernoctas en alojamientos turísticos.
•
Pagado sólo por los no residentes.
•
Limitación: al no poder diferenciarse hoteles y restaurantes en la base de datos, se simula un 3,5% sobre el consumo en ambos, ya que los hoteles representan un 35% del total.
Incremento del IVA reducido (7%) de hoteles y servicios de hostelería. a.
hasta el 12%.
b.
hasta el tipo general (16%)
1 2
Tourism taxation: an applied analysis for Spain Efectos de los impuestos simulados 1. Impuesto sobre alojamientos turísticos. •
Efecto insignificante sobre la economía en su conjunto, tanto en producción como en empleo.
•
Efecto limitado sobre hoteles y servicios de hostelería (-0,80%)
•
Los no-residentes reducen su consumo de bienes y servicios en España (-4,60% en hoteles y hostelería y -1,3% en otros bienes y servicios), debido al incremento medio de precios al que se enfrentan (+1,9%)
•
El impuesto proporciona una recaudación de 358,70 millones de euros.
1 2
Tourism taxation: an applied analysis for Spain Efectos de los impuestos simulados 2a. Incremento del IVA del 7% al 12% de hoteles y servicios de hostelería. •
Efecto reducido sobre la economía en su conjunto, tanto en producción (-0,24%) como en empleo (-0,20%).
•
Efecto significativo sobre hoteles y hostelería (-2,90%), debido al incremento de los precios (+3,50%), que provoca a su vez un incremento del IPC (0,50%).
•
La reducción del consumo de no-residentes es similar a la producida por el impuesto sobre alojamientos.
•
La recaudación es considerablemente mayor que en el impuesto sobre alojamientos (1.924,44 millones de euros)
1 2
Tourism taxation: an applied analysis for Spain Efectos de los impuestos simulados 2b. Incremento del IVA del 7% al 16% de hoteles y servicios de hostelería. •
Efecto más significativo sobre la economía en su conjunto (-0,48%), pero no tan elevado sobre el empleo (-0,3%).
•
Efecto muy significativo sobre hoteles y hostelería (-5,70%), debido al incremento de los precios (+7,00%), que provoca a su vez un incremento del IPC (+0,90%).
•
Reducción en sectores relacionados con hoteles y hostelería: alimentación y bebidas (-0,50%) y construcción (-0,30%).
•
La reducción del consumo de no-residentes es casi el doble de la producida por las otras reformas, debido a que se enfrentan a un incremento de precios de +9,00%.
•
La recaudación es prácticamente el doble que en la reforma del 12% (3.727,96 millones de euros)
1 3
Tourism taxation: an applied analysis for Spain Implicaciones de política económica • El impuesto sobre alojamientos simulado tendría efectos insignificantes sobre la economía en su conjunto, y efectos limitados sobre hoteles y servicios de hostelería. No obstante, en la práctica podrían observarse elasticidades mayores, debidas a cambios de destinos de los touroperadores motivados por el incremento impositivo. • Los efectos del incremento del IVA del 7% al 12% son similares a los del impuesto de alojamientos, pero tienen un efecto inflacionario adicional, ya que el incremento afecta a todos los consumidores, no sólo a los no residentes. • Un incremento del IVA del 7% al 16% duplicaría los costes de la reforma del 12%, afectando de manera significativa a todos los sectores de la economía. Su implantación sería, además, políticamente inviable.
1 3
Tourism taxation: an applied analysis for Spain Conclusiones • Existen tres posibles fundamentos para gravar el turismo: obtener recaudación, cubrir costes convencionales e internalizar costes externos. • El turismo no puede gravarse de manera exclusiva, pero sí de manera prioritaria a través de impuestos específicos o incrementos de impuestos generales sobre los sectores más utilizados por los turistas. • Mediante un modelo de equilibrio general se comprueba que los efectos de aplicar en España un impuesto ad valorem sobre alojamientos no tendría prácticamente efectos sobre la economía en su conjunto, y los efectos particulares serían poco significativos. • Un incremento del IVA del 7% al 12% produciría efectos similares, mientras que un incremento hasta el 16% duplicaría los costes de la reforma.
1 3
Tourism taxation: an applied analysis for Spain Production technology structure chain
O u tp u t
N o n -E n e rg y G o o d s
K LE
E n erg y
V a lu e A d d e d
P r im a r y E n e r g y
C oal
E le c tr ic it y
K
L
H yd ro ca rb o n s
+ CO2
N a tu r a l G a s
R e f in e d O il P r o d u c ts
+ CO2
+ CO2
1 3
Tourism taxation: an applied analysis for Spain Chained household consumption function structure W e lfa re
L e isu re
C o n su m p tio n
F in a l C o n su m p tio n
E n e rg y fo r P riv a te T ra n sp o rt + CO2
E n e rg y fo r th e H o u se
E le c tric ity
S a v in g s
N o n -E n e rg y G o o d s
P rim a ry E n e rg y
C oal + CO2
N a tu ra l G a s + CO2
R e fin e d O il P ro d u c ts + CO2
1 3
Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
5. Conclusions so far:
a) Need for environmental policies b) Importance of economic instruments for environmental policies c) Environmental taxation is more than a simple academic exercise - plenty of applications - some of them quite relevant - large potential
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
d) Experiences are not necessarily adjusted to theoretical recommendations e) Environmental economists should perform positive and normative studies -methods -results
f) Results for Spain are optimistic
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Environmental Policy Tools Xavier Labandeira
What about tourism and environmental policy? .... In a couple of weeks ...
THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION
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