Venezuela: A long Term Outlook
José Antonio Gil Yepes
Presented at CSIS Washington, DC July 30th, 2007
Content
– The Implosion of the Previous Regime. – Venezuela’s Political Options – The Continuation of The Institutional Bases of the Old Political System. – The Innovations of the “new” regime – In Search of Strategies to Rebuild a Pluralist Democracy – What can be Done?
2
Content
– The Implosion of the Previous Regime. – Venezuela’s Political Options – The Continuation of The Institutional Bases of the Old Political System. – The Innovations of the “new” regime – In Search of Strategies to Rebuild a Pluralist Democracy – What can be Done?
3
Implosion of the Previous Regime (1958 – 2006) Votes 6.000.000
“Pacto de Punto Fijo”
V Republic Revolution
5.000.000
MVR
4.000.000 AD
3.000.000 2.000.000 1.000.000 0 AD
PC V
PV
MEP 19 58
19 6 3
19 6 8
19 73
1.2 8 4 .0 9 2
9 57.574
1. 0 2 1.72 5
2 .12 8 . 16 1
8 4 . 4 51
0
3 0 .2 3 5
3 9 6 .2 9 3
58 9 .177
0
0
URD
8 0 0 .716
510 .9 75
4 3 9 .6 4 2
M EP
0
0
6 4 5.53 2
M AS
0
0
PPT
0
0
LC R
0
0
UNT PJ PODEMOS PPT PCV
LCR MAS
URD
M VR
C O PEI
OTROS
COPEI
19 78
19 8 3
19 8 8
19 9 3
2 .3 0 9 .577 3 .6 8 0 .54 9 3 . 8 59 .18 0 1. 3 0 4 . 8 4 9
2 9 .3 0 5
6 7.6 8 1
2 4 .6 52
19 .3 3 0
1.0 6 7. 2 11 1.54 4 .2 2 3 2 .4 14 .6 9 9 2 .16 6 . 4 6 7 2 .9 3 2 .2 77 1.2 4 1. 6 4 5
19 9 8
2000
2006
57.118
3 4 2 .2 2 7
59 1.3 6 2
8 1.9 79 14 0 .79 2
2 6 1.515
2 . 6 2 5.8 3 9 3 . 0 2 5.2 2 4 4 .8 4 5. 4 8 0 13 4 .4 78
56 . 9 2 0
8 6 .4 0 8
50 .6 4 0 2 8 .8 74
19 1.0 0 4
59 .74 7
73 .9 78
16 1.78 0
2 50 . 6 0 5
2 2 3 .19 4
3 2 . 9 16
5.18 7
8 6 .9 58
2 7.78 8
54 . 79 7
14 .0 4 5
9 4 .70 6
59 5.0 4 2
58 8 .6 4 3
54 7.19 2
71.6 0 0
14 2 .8 59 1.2 3 2 .6 53
59 7. 4 6 1 1.19 1.3 78
2 7.4 74
PJ
1. 2 9 9 . 54 6
UNT
1.555.3 6 2 759 .8 2 6
PO D EM OS OT R OS
4 5.2 8 1
116 . 4 6 3
54 6 .550
16 1.4 4 5
159 . 573
3 14 . 6 16
2 2 1.2 0 2
2 0 5.9 4 7
2 . 3 0 5.8 4 6 1. 4 53 .6 2 1 1.6 0 0 .2 0 8
Content
– The Implosion of the Previous Regime. – Venezuela’s Political Options – The Continuation of The Institutional Bases of the Old Political System. – The Innovations of the “new” regime –In Search of Strategies to Rebuild a Pluralist Democracy – What can be Done?
5
I.- Venezuela's Political Options
!Present!
The Past:
HChF
Today's Opposition
Chavismo Bloque del Cambio
¿Future? Alternatives (pending definition)
PSUV TODAY:
Very Weak
Growing Strong
Not in Sight
INSTITUTIONAL WEAKENING 6
Why Did The Old Regime Collapse? Concentration of power
Presidentialism Centralism
Inefficiency Corruption
State Ownership Limited Compensation
Party Rule Populism Oil Rent Driven Economy
Through Oil Rent Distribution
Implosion 1998
An Ambiguous System of “Limited Pluralism”*
Consumption versus Production !!!! G IINNG N N AARR ! ! W W
Despite the fact that consumption has improved temporarily, consumption consumption grows faster than production according to the structural standpoint. This situation is unfavorable to the current current positive trend in the long term.
CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION: VENEZUELA, 1936-2002
CONSUMPTION
PRODUCTION
Source: Venezuela Central Bank, BCV. Asdrúbal Baptista 8
Investment Investment and and Real Real Salary Salary
Real Income (Bs. 1984)
Gross Investment (MM/ 1984 prices)
45.000
140.000
120.000
Average Real Income per Worker
100.000
80.000
Private Investment
Correlations Priv. Inv. - Real Wage 0,86 Pub. Inv. - Real Wage 0,13 Priv. Inv. - Pub. Inv. 0,26
42.000 39.000 36.000 33.000 30.000 27.000
60.000
24.000 40.000
21.000
Public Investment
18.000
20.000 15.000 0
Source: Bases Cuantitativas de la Economía Venezolana (1830-1995) Note: since 1976, public investment includes oil (nationalized) 9
12.000
Oil Oil Prices Prices and and Votes Votes for for AD AD and and Copei Copei
40
100 90 80
Presidential Votes AD + COPEI
30
70
25 60
20
50
Congressional Votes AD + COPEI
15
40 30
10 20
5
10 0
10
19
16
20
20
13
20
10
20
07
20
04
20
01
20
98
19
95
92
19
19
89
19
86
19
83
19
80
19
77
74
19
71
19
19
68
19
65
19
62
19
59
19
56
53
19
19
19
50
0
% Votes
Crude Price Nominal$ barrel
35
Institutional Erosion and Predominance of Charismatic Leadership Legitimacy and Performance Institutions
CAP CAPI I 1974-1978 1974-1978
(-)
CAP CAPIIII 1989-1992 1989-1992
(- -)
CALDERA CALDERAIIII 1994-1998 1994-1998
(- - -)
HCHF HCHF 1999 1999
(- - - -)
Performance of Charismatic Leaders Growing (+)
Predominant (++)
Significant (+)
Overwhelming (+++)
HCHF: A continuation of a generation of institutional erosion compensated by charismatic leaders, not the origin.
11
Content
– The Implosion of the Previous Regime. – Venezuela’s Political Options – The Continuation of The Institutional Bases of the Old Political System. – The Innovations of the “new” regime –In Search of Strategies to Rebuild a Pluralist Democracy – What can be Done?
12
The Continuation of the Institutional Bases of the Old Political System + Presidencialism
+ Centralism + Concentration of Power - “Partidocracia” + Autocracy + Stateownership Opep Policy Anti West
13
+ Inhibition of Private Initiatives + Under Performance + Compensation through oil rent distribution
Poverty Corruption Concentration of power or regime's collapse Only Differences: - Autocracy: Control of public powers and institutions - “Minimized Pluralism - Confrontation with the West -Totalitarism? (National Planning Commission, July 2007)
A MORE COHERENT SYSTEM OF “MINIMIZED” AND EVENTUALLY NO PLURALISM: “DEMOCRATIC HEGEMONY”
A difficulty to interpret the Venezuelan Revolutionary Experience:
“The Only Leftist Oriented Experiment with Money” (Government money, not people´s money)
14
Content
– The Implosion of the Previous Regime. – Venezuela’s Political Options – The Continuation of The Institutional Bases of the Old Political System. – The Innovations of the “new” regime
–In Search of Strategies to Rebuild a Pluralist Democracy – What can be Done?
15
Content
The Innovations: Political Communication and Mass Mobilization From “Partidocracia” to Autocracy From “Limited Pluralism” to “Minimized Pluralism” From Alliance to the West to anti USA
16
Institutional Weakening
Leader–Masses Relation predominates
Political Communication as a key element in determining direction of the country.
Politica Communication of the Revolution 1) Control
Government Direct Control over Media: Source: Marcelino Bisbal
TV: • TVES – VTV: Cobertura nacional y Cable. • VIVE TV – Telesur – ANTV - Ávila TV : Cobertura regional y Cable. • Canales de Tv Comunitarios (Catia TV) • 28 televisoras comunitarias. Radio: • Circuito Radio Nacional de Venezuela. • Circuito YVKE Mundial. • 167 radios comunitarias. Others: • Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias (ABN) • CANTV – CVG Telecom. • > 100 paginas web.
2) Government Regulations over Private Media: • Social Responsibility of the Media Bill. • Renovation of consesions: Radio (AM) and TV • Adquisition of government advertising in private media 18 • Restricción del acceso a pautas oficiales a medios críticos.
Political Communication of the Revolution 3) Communication tactics:
• Principle of Unanimity: Show the support of the majority . • Principle of extrapolation: “With Chávez the People are in Command” • One Enemy: Generalize the adversaries in one: “The Empire, Mr. Danger”: Dismiss and delegitimize the Opposition as a vassal of the Empire. • Polarization: “Friend-Enemy” Game • Principle of Transposition: Unload on the adversary own failures and mistakes. Respond attacks with attacks. • Triangulation: Adopt the issues of the adversary and apply to them own solutions • Principle of the Internationalization of the Revolution: “Permanent Revolution” • Distract and exhaust the Opposition with a series of crisis. • Principle of Exageration and Disfiguration: Transform any story in a big event: “Siguen complotando para asesinarme” • Principle of Popularization to make messages understandable to the masses • Principle of Counter-Information: Eliminate and transform inconvinient informations. Present the “other side” of the news • Principle of Infalibility: Rarely the Leader is mistaken. If that happens, the Principle of Transposition is put into effect. 19
How do you evaluate the performace of the President for the welfare of the nation?
Support: “Very good, Good and rather good”
Pre Post RRP RRP Elec. Reg.
Salida del paro Misiones
Elec. Parl.
Pre Post RCTV. RCTV.
9 1,9 %
7 5 ,4 %
7 6 ,8 %
7 3 ,6 %
7 0 ,5 % 7 1,2 %7 1,8 % 6 7 ,1%
6 2 ,7 %
6 3 ,2 %
6 7 ,5 %
6 0 ,6 % 5 5 ,8 %
5 5 ,9 % 4 3 ,5 %
6 7 ,2 %
6 2 ,8 %
5 7 ,2 % 5 4 ,5 % 4 4 ,7 %
3 8 ,1% 3 6 ,1% 3 5 ,5 % 3 4 ,4 % 3 2 ,3 %
7 0 ,1%
5 6 ,2 %
5 4 ,8 %
7 2 ,8 %
7 3 ,1% 7 1,2 % 7 0 ,1%7 0 ,5 %7 0 ,8 %
6 7 ,6 %
6 7 ,4 % 6 5 ,0 %
6 6 ,3 %
6 2 ,5 %
5 5 ,2 % 5 4 ,6 %
4 1,7 % 4 1,5 % 3 6 ,8 % 3 5 ,1% 3 6 ,1% 3 2 ,6 %
6 9 ,8 %
6 4 ,2 %
5 9 ,2 %
6 2 ,8 %
4 2 ,8 %
2 1,8 %
6 5 ,4 %
6 3 ,8 %
6 6 ,1% 5 8 ,4 %
6 4 ,7 % 6 3 ,1% 5 5 ,8 %
4 8 ,8 %
5 3 ,7 % 5 0 ,8 %
4 3 ,3 %4 8 %
4 1,6 % 3 6 ,3 %
4 1,4 % 4 1,5 % 4 4 ,8 % 3 7 ,2 %
3 2 ,0 %
2 4 ,8 % 2 6 ,3 % 2 2 ,8 %
3 0 ,8 %
2 9 ,6 %
3 0 ,0 %
2 9 ,8 %
3 1,3 % 2 7 ,0 %
2 2 ,9 %
Rejection: “Very bad, Bad and rather badly”
Reelección HChF.
2 2 ,3 %
2 3 ,4 %
2 1,9 %
2 5 ,2 %
2 7 ,3 % 2 4 ,8 %
2 4 ,6 % 2 1,1% 2 3 ,8 % 2 0 ,0 %
2 6 ,9 %
2 9 ,1% 2 8 ,2 %
5 ,2 %
F eb F ebM ayJun F ebJul D ic F eb A b r JunN o vF ebM ay Jul Sep N o v D ic F eb M arM ay Jul A g oA g o Oct N o v Ene M arA b rM ayJun Jul Sep Oct D ic F eb M arA b rM ayJun Jul A g oSep N o vF eb M arM ayM ayJun9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 I 0 4 II 0 4 0 4 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 I 0 6 0 7 0 7 I 0 7 I I 0 7 04 07
© Mayo y Junio 2007 Datanalisis
Encuesta Nacional Ómnibus; 1.300 hogares; error muestral 2.72%. Fecha de campo: Mayo: Del 20 al 28 de Mayo y Junio: Del 20 al 30 de Junio
Content
The Innovations: Political Communication and Mass Mobilization From “Partidocracia” to Autocracy From “Limited Pluralism” to “Minimized Pluralism” From Alliance to the West to anti USA
21
The influence of the Executive upon the rest of Public Powers…
National Assembly
22
TSJ
CNE
General Attorney’s Office
General Accounting of the Republic
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Administration
Control over other Public Institutions
Budget Control
Governorships
Elections
Institutional Paralelism
Colonization
Health – Barrio Adentro
F.A.N …or ¿Bolivarian Army?
National Assembly
Starting from April 11th 2002 Feeding – Mercal
Municipalities
Ex:
Governorships
Parroquial Boards
Education – Missions Sucre, Vuelvan Caras, Rivas, Bolivarian University of Vzla. Mayor’s offices – Community Councils
Mayors Now: Communal Councils Subsidies: “Missions”
23
Central Bank of Venezuela – Other Funds
Transitory dispositions of the 1999 Constitution
Unions – National Workers’ Union
PDVSA …”Roja, rojita”(RED) starting from February 2003
Revolutionary Movement: PSUV, ¿Unified Party or Unique Party? Starting from 2007
Content
The Innovations: Political Communication and Mass Mobilization From “Partidocracia” to Autocracy From “Limited Pluralism” to “Minimized Pluralism” From Alliance to the West to anti USA
24
The Triumphs over the Opposition I.- 1998 – 2002: In, Out and Back
II.- 2002 – 2004: Institutional Colonization
III.- 2004 – 2006: “Deepening of the Revolution”
IV.- 2007: “Acceleration of the Revolution”
25
I.- 1998 – 2002: Start, Exit and Return National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) Summoned
Government Imposes NCA not established in the 1961 Constitution Support of public Opinion
Opposition NCA accepted by Supreme Court, dominated by traditional parties Traditional parties do not react
Invites “everybody” to resister as candidate. But officialist group presents only one candidate per post. Election of Representatives to NCA 65% votes=94% seats
27 non officialist candidate per post Only 6 non officialist representatives elected
Transitory Dispositions of the 1999 Constitution allowed the National Assembly to nominate the new Comptroller, Appointment of new public Attorney General, Ombudsman, Directors of the National powers authorities. Electoral Council, some Magistrates
No mobilization against the formula
This “relegitimation” started anew the term in office. “Relegitimation” Elections Francisco Arias Cárdenas (FAC) run against Chavez, but After approval of 1999 latter experiences imply that there was an understanding Constitution between them.
The opposition (40%), except AD, PV,URD and COPEI, voted for FAC
Content of Laws was kept secret until last minute Approval of 49 bills No consultation with sectors affected became a major enabling law issue of protest Confrontation government A (political board of directors of PDVSA became major -PDVSA issue of protest. Resignation of PDVSA’s Board on Wednesday, April 10 was not informed to the public Exit from power (April Protests continued on Thursday, April 11 11, 2002) Return to De facto relegitimation vis a vis International audiences: power (April 13, 2002) resignation ignored, presented as “coup”
Massive marches and a 1 day National Strike led by FEDECAMARAS and CTV, since Oct. 2001.
26
The 1 million strong march in Caracas ends in death of 30 protesters. The majority of the military ask the President for his resignation.
II.- 2002 – 2004: Institutional Colonization Government
Opposition Some military leaders asked for asylum Some went clandestine Most became silent
“Cleansening” of armed forces top brass.
Removal of most military commanders Unification of military components: From FFAA to FAN
Table of dialogue
Raised expectations of negotiations Naively prepared their presentations to the Negotiation Table changed for Table of Dialogue government End without (any) result FEDECAMARAS-CTV call for national strike PDVSA joins strike Opposition maintains strike for 57 days: ends exhausted
National Civic Strike
PDVSA was not going on strike: manipulation by means of “parallel assembly” asking for the resignation of top managers Renewed provocations to prolongue the strike
“Cleansening” of PDVSA´s technocracy
18.000 of PDVSA employees fired by President Exhausted opposition unable to mobilize against on TV PDVSA´s dismissals.
“Missions” (subsidy programs) created
Mid 2003: Heath, education and food subsidies. critics stopped due to ample popular Start of massive, instead of individual subsidies Initial acceptance of subsidies
Negotiation table for conditions of recall referendum OAS and Carter Center in Venezuela
Signatures disregarded New signatures must be collected Some signatures disqualified again Referendum postponed from legal date, Nov.2003, until Aug. 2004
27
Signatures collected 3 times Opposition, OAS and Carter Center accept all the conditions imposed by the government. European Community retired its representatives
III.- 2004 – 2006: “Deepening of the Revolution”
Government “No”: 58% Recall referendum won by HChF (15/08/04)
2004 regional and local elections.
100% officialist Control of National Assembly (Dic. 2005)
28
Opposition “Yes”: 32% Some movements, parties and spokespersons of the opposition called the defeat a “fraud”. Fraud never proved Proliferation of candidates, again From 8 gov. to 2 From (approx.) 126 mayors to 40
Repeated strategy: one officialist candidate per post. Increased control over governorships and municipalities Government did not turn over lists of voters to The 2004 call of “fraud” motivated absenteeism of the opposition: mobilize a distrust the opposition and non committed in the congressional election One candidate per post MVR: individual ballot Proliferation of candidates per post, again A parallel party: UVE, took the list ballot Most opposition parties retired their candidates the week prior to the polls
IV.- 2007: Acceleration of the Revolution Government 63% (7.309.080 votes)
Opposition 37% Manuel Rosales opposition recognizes HChF´s victory and announces that it will be a counter-weight to the government
--Unanimous approval -- 18 months -Includes antitrust law and a bill against “illicit” exchange of foreign currency
Manuel Rosales back to Zulias´s governorship… low national profile
Reelection Presidential.
3rd. Enabling Law
- Delegation of powers - Constitutional reform The “Five Motors” of the - Socialist Education Revolution for Accelerating - Territorial realignment for an endogenous XXI Century Socialism economy - Communal power consolidation Surprise Renewed state ownership (Oil, Full Compensations Telecommunications, electricity Presidential and gov. increased exposure through the media Growing control over Communications. RCTV´s license not renewed Threats to private media
Constitutional Reform 29
Presidentialism – Autocracy; eg. Illimited reelections prime minister several vice president State planning Stateownership – Totalitarism Centralism Populism
Mild, sporadic reactions
Sudden end of positive expectations by potential investors No complaints by those affected Street protest/ RCTV, moderate impact Strong international reaction/ RCTV
?
Strategies and Impacts of “Innovations” on the Internal Front
HChF’s Strategy
Gradual, Long Term Strategy
CAP’s Strategy
Shock: Abrupt Changes in the Economy
CAP (1989)
Short Term Goals
Integral Handling of Social Change: • Communicational. • Polítical • Social • Económic • Institucional 30
Parcial Hangling of Social Change: • Económic • Institutional Changes lagged behind • Absence of a Communication Strategy
Strategies and Impacts of “Innovations” on the Internal Front
OFFICIALISM One Objective: Power
OPPOSITION Two Objectives: 1) Change the Pres. 2) Compete for power
Lidership: One
Liderships: Many; fragmented
Profile: High
Profile: Low and Erratic
National Project: Publicized
National Proyect: Unknown
Resources available
Resources available up to 2005
Politics as war: Psico war Delay Distract Desinform Divide “Negociate”
Improvised and “negotiated” Strategies: Competing leaderships Two competing objectives Fraud vs votes Abstention Accept the unacceptable Subjective thinking
1998
2000
Elección Presidencial 1998 Salas Römer “Megaelección” de Relegitimación 2000 Arias Cárdenas
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Disappearance of Opposition Leaders. Abril 2002 Pedro Carmona Paro Cívico Nacional Diciembre 2002 – Febrero 2003 Carlos Fernández, Juan Fernández y Carlos Ortega Referéndum Revocatorio Presidencial Agosto 2004 Coordinadora Democrática Enrique Mendoza Elecciones regionales Octubre 2004
Elecciones municipales y parroquiales Agosto 2005 Elecciones parlamentarias Diciembre 2005 Retiro de la Oposición
Elecciones Presidenciales Diciembre 2006
Content
The Innovations: Political Communication and Mass Mobilization From “Partidocracia” to Autocracy From “Limited Pluralism” to “Minimized Pluralism” From Alliance to the West to anti USA
International Level There are two clear directions in the acting of H.Chavez in the International scene:
Turn Venezuela into a continental reference, while challeging US influence in the Caribbean and South America.
ALBA
Venezuela
Bolivia
ALCA TLC
Cuba
Nicaragua
PetroCaribe Oil Interchange (Supply and technical assistance) Commercial Interchange Financial agreements (Banco del Sur)
Reduce technological and military dependence towards the United States.
Caribe Bolivia Ecuador Argentina Brasil Uruguay Colombia
Irán
Technical and military agreement of support and sales of equipment, maintenance and logistics. Commercial agreements of vehicle assembly, cement factories, cooperation in hydrocarbon and nuclear energy. .
Rusia
Acquisition of armament, spare parts, advice and services concerning warlike subjects.
China
Technologic supplier in satellite areas, cell phones, assembly of computers and software production. Agreements concerning constructions in Venezuela and gas development.
“Hard socialism” Axis
Latin America
35
Strategies to export the Bolivarian Revolution to the American continent
Peru • Employment of economic power (Petro diplomacy): −Government bonds −Banco del Sur −Petrocaribe • Incidence on social organizations and local leaders. • Construction of regional alliances (ALBA vs. ALCA) • International assistance Mission “Miracle”, Grants, “Gifts”, Investments
36
Mexico Ecuador
Colombia Cuba
Strategies of exports of the Bolivarian Revolution to the American continent
Forms of influence
Balance
37
Financing of social movements and Pymes. Attendance (Missions: Miracle and Robinson)
Contacts in the country
Connection with the Government of H. Chavez
Representatives of the Government Deputies Mayors Representatives of Social Movements Issues generations contacts: − Election − Programs for the poor − Filling institutional vacuums − Public deficits − Commercial/ industrial projects
Ambassadors. Persons in charge of embassy’s business Mayors Organizations Pro Government (Aporrea)
Main achievements Transform Venezuela into a referent in continental solidarity to: 1) counteract US influence. 2) Have influence in internal decisions of each country.
Relationship between Venezuela-EEUU 1. The confrontation strategy of the US government with the Venezuelan Government: Facilitates the Venezuela government’s communication effort against “US hegemony”. Financial support to other governments The advantage of unattended needs to offer “helps” Permits the Venezuelan Government to approach governments who do not agree with the United States or would encourage multipolarism.
2. Despite this, the Venezuelan Government commits mistakes: The grandiloquence and disqualifying speech by President Chavez against US President, George W. Bush was not well received by the international community. (case of ONU speech). Helping poor people of Bronx, selling them cheap oil, but, on the other hand, disturbing delivery US help in the slumbs of Caracas. 38
The Key Impact of the “Innovations”: “ The minimization of pluralism is the most significant loss due to the V Republic’s social changes. The negatives impacts on the economy can be recuperated faster and easier due to oil income. The V Republic is also offering opportunities to the development of micro, small, medium, large (oil, gas) size enterprises and cooperatives, more than ever before.” Treatment of each economic sector tends to be specific: There is no “one formula”. 39
Content
– The Implosion of the Previous Regime. – Venezuela’s Political Options – The Continuation of The Institutional Bases of the Old Political System. – The Innovations of the “new” regime –In Search of Strategies to Rebuild a Pluralist Democracy – What can be Done?
40
The Limitants of the Revolution Revolution +Presidencialism- Authocracy
+Centralism
+Stateownership
+Opep Policy
+Anti West
+Loss of Liberties 41
Limitants Public Opinion Fidel: “You have no institution to continue the Revolution” Officialist Governors and Mayors • Importance of Non-oil Fiscal Income • Popular Concept of Socialism • Concern for Reactivation of Protest (None) Diplomatic-Economic Relations Rejection of Cuban and non libertarian models • Public Opinion • Technocracies • Remaining Autonomous Sectors • Attachment to Private Property
If next Sunday, a referedum took place to approve the Constitutional Reform, how would you vote, in favor or against the unlimited reelection of the President?
Strata Strata
Political Political Self Self Definition Definition
A/B
C
D
E
Pro Gov.
Ni ni
Pro Opp.
77,8%
51,0%
42,4%
33,0%
13,7%
49,5%
90,6%
3,7%
20,9%
28,5%
35,1%
67,2%
10,8%
1,5%
DEPENDS 1,0%
0,0%
1,7%
0,9%
0,9%
1,1%
1,5%
0,0%
OTHER 0,7%
0,0%
1,7%
0,6%
0,4%
0,0%
1,1%
1,0%
18,5%
24,6%
27,6%
30,7%
18,0%
37,0%
7,0%
27
239
467
567
467
545
202
40,6%
AGAINST
IN FAVOR
DON’T KNOW/NO ANSW.
29,5%
28,3% Base
© Mayo y Junio 2007 Datanalisis
Encuesta Nacional Ómnibus; 1.300 hogares; error muestral 2.72%. Fecha de campo: Mayo: Del 20 al 28 de Mayo y Junio: Del 20 al 30 de Junio
Political Self Definition
Post RCTV Salida del paro Misiones
Pre RRP
Post- Elec. RRP Reg.
Issue Tierras.
60%
Inicio Campaña
Pre Post Parl. Parl.
De la Oposición/ Antichavista
55%
Reelección
Pre RCTV
Candidato unitario (Oposición)
De Ninguno de los dos bandos Pro Gobierno/ Chavista
50%
No contesta
45%
42,2%
43,2% 42,1% 40,1%
40%
38,2% 38,6% 37,4%
37,0% 36,8%
35% 36,7% 30%
49,5% 46,8% 46,3%
36,8% 34,7% 32,5%
38,7% 33,0%32,8%
39,1% 37,6% 35,5%
46,1%
25,5% 24,8% 23,6% 22,6% 20%
39,5%
40,5% 38,5%
38,8%
36,6% 33,8%
33,3%
38,0%
33,5%
20,8%
22,8% 19,5%
18,0%
17,4%
15,5% 13,2% 13,5%
14,6%
12,1% 2,8%2,5% 2,6% 2,2% 1,0% 0,5%
12,6%12,4%
5,1%
4,0% 4,0%
2,5% 3,0% 2,9% 2,8% 2,9% 1,3% 1,4%1,0% 1,1%
M ay 04
Ago I 04
Oct 04
Ene 05
Abr 05
15,8% 11,6%
12,9% 7,8%
7,2%
17,8%
15,9% 13,5%
15,9%
13,0% 12,2% 7,5%
15,8%
3,8%
Jun 05
Sep 05
6,6%
5,3% 2,8%
3,5%
17,5% 15,5%
8,2% 8,2%
3,9%4,5%
0% F eb 04
28,2%
28,1%
28,0%27,0% 26,2% 25,7%25,7% 24,5%
14,4%
Nov 03
40,5% 42,4%42,1% 38,8% 41,9% 37,9% 40,0% 35,9%
26,4%
10%
Jul 03
41,2% 40,5% 40,5%
36,9% 35,9%
15%
F eb 03
41,2% 39,7%
25,2%
25%
5%
47,1%
39,8%
42,5%
36,7% 35,6%
33,0%
45,7%
44,9% 45,0%
41,3%
42,2% 40,4% 39,7% 38,7%
35,3% 30,1% 33,5% 33,6%32,4% 30,2%
29,2% 25,2%
42,2% 42,4% 40,8% 40,7% 40,5%
47,7%
2,7%
1,9% D ic 05
6,8%6,3% 5,4%
6,1%
M ar 06
M ay 06
3,7% Jul 06
Sep 06
Nov II 06
M ar 07
4,7% M ay II 07
Base: Base: 1.300 1.300 © Mayo y Junio 2007 Datanalisis
Encuesta Nacional Ómnibus; 1.300 hogares; error muestral 2.72%. Fecha de campo: Mayo: Del 20 al 28 de Mayo y Junio: Del 20 al 30 de Junio
Opiniones Positivas de los Ni- Ni Positiva Prefiere un trabajo fijo Expectativas sobre la situación personal para el 2007
Negativa
89,1%
6,2%
87,4%
6,9%
Se necesita de la oposición en Venezuela
82,9%
8,6%
Se necesita de los partidos políticos En el “Socialismo del siglo XXI” debe respetarse la propiedad privada En la Asamblea Nacional deben estar representados todos los sectores políticos
82,3%
9,1%
Expectativas (positivas) sobre la situación económica del país para el 2007
81,7%
4,6%
81,1%
4,6%
80,0%
Evaluación (positiva) de la situación personal
15,4%
78,3%
20,0%
Expectativas (positivas) sobre la situación política del país para el 2007
73,1%
Cambiar a los ministros del gobierno
72,6%
27,4%
Evaluación (positiva) de la situación del país
70,9%
26,9%
El gobierno debe apoyar por igual a las Empresas Privadas y las Cooperativas Prefiere tener su propia empresa; ser un empresario privado
70,3%
15,4%
7,9%
70,3%
Conformación del partido único de oposición
25,1%
58,9%
Expectativas (positivas) sobre la convivencia entre los venezolanos para el 2007
52,6%
El gobierno debe ampliar las Misiones
50,9%
© Mayo y Junio 2007 Datanalisis
20,0% 32,6% 6,3%
Encuesta Nacional Ómnibus; 1.300 hogares; error muestral 2.72%. Fecha de campo: Mayo: Del 20 al 28 de Mayo y Junio: Del 20 al 30 de Junio
Opiniones de los Ni- Ni divididas y desfavorables Positiva El Gobierno Nacional debe entregarle a cada familia venezolana una tarjeta de débito con 600 mil bolívares mensuales provenientes de los recursos petroleros El nuevo modelo de educación bolivariana propuesto por el Gobierno Nacional
Transformación de colegios públicos en colegios bolivarianos Me gusta la actuación de los diputados que están en la Asamblea Nacional
Conformación del partido único de gobierno
Negativa
35,4%
30,3%
30,9%
31,4%
38,3%
32,6% 17,7% 13,7%
Transformación de colegios privados y católicos en colegios bolivarianos
24,6%
Transformación de colegios privados en colegios bolivarianos
23,4%
La reforma constitucional para hacer ilimitados el numero de veces que se puede reelegir al Presidente
22,3%
40,6% 48,0% 52,0% 60,0%
Se puede apoyar el gobierno de un hombre fuerte si la democracia no resuelve el problema de la pobreza y la inseguridad
12,0%
La sustitución de dinero por boletos de trueque para comprar en mercados bolivarianos
10,9%
Se puede apoyar a un gobierno militar si la democracia no resuelve el problema de la pobreza y la inseguridad
35,4%
6,9%
69,7% 72,0% 76,6%
El Gobierno Nacional sustituya a los padres al 5,7% 78,9% momento de tomar las decisiones sobre los hijos menores de edad © Mayo y Junio 2007 Datanalisis Encuesta Nacional Ómnibus; 1.300 hogares; error muestral 2.72%. Fecha de campo: Mayo: Del 20 al 28 de Mayo y Junio: Del 20 al 30 de Junio
The Limitants of the Revolution Revolution
Limitants
+Presidencialism- Authocracy
+Centralism
+Stateownership
+Opep Policy
+Anti West
+Loss of Liberties © Mayo y Junio 2007 Datanalisis
Public Opinion No institution to continue the Revolution Officialist Governors and Mayors • Importance of Non-oil Fiscal Income • Popular Concept of Socialism • Concern for Reactivation of Protest (None) Diplomatic-Economic Relations Rejection of Cuban and non libertarian models
• Public Opinion • Technocracies • Remaining Autonomous Sectors Encuesta Nacional Ómnibus; 1.300 error muestral 2.72%. • Attachment to hogares; Private Property Fecha de campo: Mayo: Del 20 al 28 de Mayo y Junio: Del 20 al 30 de Junio
Importance of Non Oil Fiscal Income Fiscal Income 2007 (106,5 MMMM Bs)
No Petrolero 55%
47
Petrolero 45%
Fuente: Ley Nacional de Presupuesto 2007
Private Property
Thoughening Thougheningofofpolitical political message messageand anddecisions decisions
Communism? Communism?
Radicalization: Radicalization Radicalization: • •New Cabinet New Cabinet • •RCTV RCTVlicense license • •Growing GrowingState StateOwnership Ownership
Which Whichisisthe the model ? model?
Capitalism? Capitalism?
Schizophrenic!! Schizophrenic!!
Private Privatesector sectorstill still controls controlsmost mostofofthe the economy economy
Property Models Applied to Different Economic Sectors (2007) Chinese Capitalism Mixed Joint State Own. Mgmt./Coop. Companies
Socialism
Colectivism
Center-left
Free Market
Regulated Companies
48
Niveles de Intervencionismo Diferencias sectoriales
Apropiación
Servicios Básicos
51
Regulación
Alimentos, Farmacia, Construcción, Cemento y Bienes de primera necesidad
Control de Importaciones
Comercio y Manufactura
Indiferencia
Medianas empresas de distintos sectores
Promoción
Empresas de Producción Social (EPS) y Cooperativas
Criteria to Assess Potential Investors
GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT
MARKET MARKET
Government Governmentefficiency efficiency
Government Governmentinefficiency inefficiency
Governability– Governability–Obedience Obedience
Ungovernability Ungovernability–Disobedience –Disobedience
Oil Oilrevenue revenue
Need Needofofnon nonoil oilrevenue revenue
Strategic Strategicand andideologic ideologic interests. interests.
International Internationalcommitments commitments
Private Privateenemies enemies
Private Privatefriends friends
RCTV CANTV ELECTRICITIES
SIDOR CONSTRUCTION 52
Schizophrenic Model
In summary: The Rule seems to be… “Having as much State Ownership as it is feasible and… keeping as much unavoidable.”
market
as
it
is
( But it may be that the awareness of the need for private enterprise Is growing among officialists) 53
Importance of Non Oil Fiscal Income Recent Statements by Top Representatives of the Revolution IRS: SENIAT National Superintendent: • “I believe that different economic models should coexist…I support The strenghthening of the private sector because it generates jobs.” • “The State should protect private property,…as well as public and collective Property…We should all cohabitate in a grand array of options and let people Select what suits them best: private property, cooperatives, Enterprises of Social Production, etc.” • “…we are looking for some coincidences with models that have succeeded With socialism, such as Denmark, Sweden and Finland. We know that there Have been failures with other socialist experiences.” El Nacional, Caracas, July 22nd., 2007, page 4.
54
Fuente: Ley Nacional de Presupuesto 2007
Importance of Non Oil Fiscal Income Recent Statements by Top Representatives of the Revolution Ex Defense Minister: Raul Baduel “Much has been said by social analists about the inconviniencies of repeating in Venezuela the mistakes of the ex Soviet Union and other countries… , for instance, the predominance of the Communist Party over the State and the People. A party that displaced society and ended up being itself controlled by the Party’s Central Committee.” “…Our socialist model must be profoundly democratic. It must define, once and for all, that a socialist regime of production is not incompatible with Democracy, with counterbalancing powers. In this respect, I do believe that we should depart from Marxist orthodoxy, which considers that a Democracy with separation of Powers is nothing but an instrument of bougeois domination.
55
Fuente: Ley Nacional de Presupuesto 2007
Importance of Non Oil Fiscal Income Recent Statements by Top Representatives of the Revolution Ex Defense Minister: Raul Baduel “Economic mistakes were also made in socialist countries. We must not repeat those mistakes. Those countries were plagued with insuficient generation of wealth, in spite of accelerated industrialization, its five year plans,… They could not offer enough confort to their populations”. “We cannot allow our system to become one of State Capitalism. A system in which the State is the sole owner of the big means of production. It would be a mistake to call label a country socialist and, at the same time, practice State Capitalism, as If it were “war communism”, as in the Soviet Union, under Lenin. Such action lead to the failures of agriculture and industry which, in turn, led to discontent, anarchy, hunger and an anticommunist rebellion which almost topled the Bolchevik Revolution. Prices rose drastically, while production plumeted”.
56
Fuente: Ley Nacional de Presupuesto 2007
Importance of Non Oil Fiscal Income Recent Statements by Top Representatives of the Revolution Ex Defense Minister: Raul Baduel “Before distributing wealth, it must be produced…The socialist model we create must one that shows the path to produce wealth, first, and then distribute it fairly among those that generated it.” “During the previous regime, its goverments used the excesive wealth produced by the oil boom to finance all kinds of subsidies. Numerous Venezuelans came to depend entirely on official help. Instead of teaching Venezuelans to produce wealth through work and effort, they were taught to ask for government help. When the oil boom ended, the State was unable to continue subsidizing the national economy. It was then that our country submerged in a crisis,…” “Our socialist model must avoid the repetition of these mistakes.” Speech at the Military Academy, Transmission of Command, July 18th, 2007 57
Fuente: Ley Nacional de Presupuesto 2007
Socialism vs. Capitalism In Public Opinion
58
If you had to choose between capitalism and socialism, which system would you choose for Venezuela? From From April April 05 05 to to April April 06 06 Basis: Basis: 1.300 1.300 Nov Nov II 06 06 Basis: Basis: 1.600 1.600
55,9%
Feb Feb 07 07 Basis: Basis: 1.300 1.300
50,6%
45,3% 37,8%
Socialism
33,5%
Capitalism
32,0%
RDNK/ NR
27,9%
27,6% 28,7%
26,7% 22,2%
26,4% 17,1% 15,5%
9,2%
May-05
Jun-05
17,0%
•Socialism •Capitalism •None of them •RDNK NR •Basis
•34
•C •29.8 % •38.9 % •20.2 % •11.0 % •208
•D •41.9 % •22.8 % •19.1 % •16.1 % •482
23,2%
22,9%
23,0%
7,8%
8,5%
Apr-06
Nov-06
24,5%
13,9%
10,2% 4,8%
Jul-05
Oct-05
Feb-06
Feb-07
Do you deem yourself to be…?
Target •A/B •11.8 % •58.8 % •20.6 % •8,8%
24,7%
19,5%
25,4%
11,7%
7,5%
6,6%
April-05
42,1%
39,7%
22,5%
None of them
44,5%
43,6%
•E •48.4 % •18.8 % •19.6 % •13.2 % •576
Pro Govt.
Neither one or the other
Pro Opposition
Socialism
74.8%
24.5%
5.6%
Capitalism
4.8%
29.6%
61.1%
None of them
8.6%
28.4%
24.8%
11.8%
17.5%
8.6%
547
493
234
RDNK/ NR Basis
59
When I mention the word Capitalism, what’s the first thing that comes to your mind? When I mention the word Socialism, what’s the first thing that comes to your mind?
Socialism
Capitalism 29,0%
Wealth/Progress/ Prosperity/ Equality
Equality/Fairness/ Welfare Government system / Participation/ Freedom Associationism/ Solidarity/ Cooperation Wealth/Progress/Prosperity
10,0% 6,0%
Other
Private companies/ Investments/ Production
6,9%
(of the press, of speech, etc.)
12,3%
Money allocated unfairly/ Few have money / Dictatorship
16,5%
-: 18,0%
1,5%
The United States/ the Empire/ Bush
Respondent doesn’t know/ No
15,7%
7,6%
Respondent doesn’t know/No response
14,7%
19,4%
Response
Pro Govt.
Politi cally neutral
Pro Oppo.
Equality/Fairness/Welfare
41,3%
24,5%
8,9%
Government system/Participation/ Freedom Associationism/ Solidarity/ Cooperation Wealth/Progress/Prosperity
12,6%
8,2%
7,2%
6,7%
7,7%
2,5%
0,2%
0,4%
0,0%
The Chavez Admnistration Communism/ The Cuban Regime/ Limited freedom Money allocate unfairly/Expropriations Other
10,6%
10,4%
20,1%
5,1%
20,2%
35,6%
0,0% 9,1% 14,4%
1,6% 8,7% 18,3%
3,4% 15,0% 7,3%
547
493
234
Respondent does not know/ No response Basis
Wealth/Progress/ Prosperity/ Equality Private companies/ Investments/ Production Government system/ Freedom Money allocated unfairly/ Few have money/ Dictatorship United States/ Bush/the Empire Other Respondent doesn’t know/No response Basis
-: 20,6%
4,9%
Other
9,8%
+: 52.4%
10,9%
Government system/ Freedom
0,2%
The Chávez Administration Communism/ Cuban Regime/ Limited freedom Money allocated unfairly /Expropriations
+: 45,2%
34,6%
Pro Govt.
Neithe r one or the other
Pro Opp.
30,0%
37,9%
37,5%
8,2%
10,3%
18,4%
2,1%
8,6%
13,6%
21,1%
13,9%
6,5%
8,2%
2,8%
1,7%
7,5%
6,8%
11,6%
22,9%
19,7%
10,7%
547
493
234
Basis: 1300
60
Perceptions about Government Intervention in Private Companies
61
Next, I will say several phrases, and I will ask you to what extent do you agree or disagree with each one: Agreement: I agree completely/ I agree
The expropriation of …
Indifferent: I am neither in agreement nor in disagreement
Disagreement: I disagree completely / I am in disagreement
December 2006
Agreement
Indifferent
Disagreement
No response
Small and medium size factories currently producing
81,9%
4,4%
Harvesting lands
81,8%
4,0% 9,5%
80,9%
4,8% 10,0% 4,3%
80,6%
4,6%
Large factories currently producing
9,9% 3,8% 4,7%
Ranches currently producing
Small and medium size factories currently producing
Pro Gob.
Polit. neutral
Pro Opo.
Disagreement
79.9%
77.7%
90.3%
Indifferent
4.3%
6.9%
Agreement
13.0%
RDNK/ NR
Large factories currently producing
9,4%
5,4%
Pro Govt.
Pol. neutral
Pro Opo.
Disagreement
79.4%
76.0%
89.1%
2.3%
Indifferent
4.0%
6.9%
4.0%
8.0%
5.1%
Agreement
12.6%
9.7%
5.1%
2.8%
7.4%
2.3%
RDNK/ NR
4.0%
7.4%
1.8%
422
175
175
422
175
175
Pro Gob.
Neither one or the Other
Pro Opo.
Pro Gob.
Neither one or the other
Pro Opo.
Disagreement
79.4%
78.9%
90.3%
Disagreement
78.0%
75.4%
90.9%
Indifferent
3.8%
6.9%
1.7%
Indifferent
4.5%
6.9%
2.9%
Agreement
12.1%
6.9%
6.3%
Agreement
12.1%
9.1%
4.0%
RDNK/ NR
4.7%
7.3%
1.7%
RDNK/ NR
5.5%
8.6%
2.3%
422
175
175
422
175
Basis
Harvesting lands
Basis
© Diciembre 2006 Datanalisis
Basis
Ranches currently producing
National Post Electoral Poll. 800 households. Sampling error: 3.46% Field date: December 7-15, 2006
Basis
Base: 175 800 Base: 800 62
Concerning the kind of income I will list, which one do you prefer? December 2006
A steady job
2,1% 1,4%
92,0% 4,5%
An off and on job A subsidy to be participate in welfare programs (the so called misiones)
Responen does not know/ No response
Basis: Basis: 800 800
Target December 2006
Do you consider yourself to be...
A/B
C
D
E
Pro – Govt.
Politically Neutral
Pro Opposition
A steady job
81.0%
95.4%
91.4%
91.7%
95.0%
89.1%
87.4%
An off and on job
0.0%
2.0%
3.0%
1.7%
0.5%
5.1%
3.4%
0.0%
0.0%
1.1%
2.2%
1.9%
1.1%
0.0%
19.0%
2.6%
4.5%
4.4%
2.6%
4.7%
9.2%
21
151
266
362
422
175
175
A subsidy to participate in welfare programs (Misiones) Respondent doesn’t know/ No response Basis
© December 2006 Datanalisis
National Post Electoral Poll. 800 households. Sampling error: 3.46% Field date: December 7-15, 2006
63
Do you believe private companies are needed to create jobs? Do Do you you consider consider yourself yourself to to be…? be…?
Needless 1,5%
Pro Govt.
Neither one or the other (politically neutral)
Pro Oppositio n
14,6%
3,2%
3,0%
82,1%
94,9%
94,4%
3,3%
1,9%
2,6%
547
493
234
Unnecessary: 8,0%
Little needed
6,5%
Needed
49,5% Necessary: 89,3%
Very much needed
Respondent doesn’t know/
39,8%
2,7%
No response
Basis: 1300 Basis: 1300
Basis
64
The Limitants of the Revolution Revolution +Presidencialism- Authocracy
+Centralism
+Stateownership
+Opep Policy
+Anti West
+Loss of Liberties
Limitants Public Opinion No institution to continue the Revolution Officialist Governors and Mayors • Importance of Non-oil Fiscal Income • Popular Concept of Socialism • Concern for Reactivation of Protest (None) Diplomatic-Economic Relations Rejection of Cuban and non libertarian models • Public Opinion • Technocracies • Remaining Autonomous Sectors • Attachment to Private Property
65
¿Cuál es su posición con respecto a que Venezuela tome como ejemplo el régimen cubano de Fidel Castro? Críticos “Muy en contra”/ “En contra” 92,5%
88,9%
91,1%
86,8% 81,4%
86,8% 84,4%
76,6%
76,3% 80,5% 77,2%
69,0% 63,2%
78,3%
79,0%
82,1%
78,5%
78,2%
78,6%
69,4%
75,8%
73,5% 66,4%
18,1% 15,7% 15,1% 13,8%12,6% 12,5%
Ni a favor ni en contra 3,3% Apoyos 3,3%
77,0%
78,8%
9,8%
13,2% 13,7% 12,0% 11,4% 12,5% 10,3% 12,2% 9,5%10,8%
11,4%
9,8% 8,8% 6,2% 11,6%12,0% 4,5% 4,8% 10,3% 10,5% 7,8% 3,0% 8,6% 8,5% 7,0% 5,9% 7,0% 6,0% 5,3% 4,9% 5,3% 5,9%6,7% 2,7% 4,8% 4,3%
4,0% 4,5% 6,0% 5,2% 3,0% 3,0%
“Muy a favor”/ “A favor” Nov Jul Feb Mar May Ene Mar Abr May Jun Jul Sep Oct Dic Feb Mar Abr May Jun Jul Ago Sep Nov Feb May 02
03
04
04
04
05
05
** La La diferencia diferencia con con respecto respecto al al 100% 100% se se debe debe aa “No sabe/ No contesta” “No sabe/ No contesta”
05
05
05
05
05
05
Desde Desde Nov Nov 02 02 Hasta Hasta Jul Jul 03 03 Mar Mar 04 04
© Mayo 2007 Datanalisis
05
06
06
06
06
06
06
06
06 I 06 07
Base: Base: 1.000 1.000
Desde Desde Abr Abr 04 04 hasta hasta el el presente presente
Base: Base: 1.291 1.291
Nov Nov II 04 04
Encuesta Nacional Ómnibus; 1.300 hogares; error muestral 2.72%. Fecha de campo: Del 20 al 28 de Mayo.
07
Base: Base: 1.300 1.300 Base: Base: 1.600 1.600
The Limitants of the Revolution Revolution +Presidencialism- Authocracy
+Centralism
+Stateownership
+Opep Policy
+Anti West
+Loss of Liberties
Limitants Public Opinion No institution to continue the Revolution
Officialist Governors and Mayors • Importance of Non-oil Fiscal Income • Popular Concept of Socialism • Concern for Reactivation of Protest (None) Diplomatic-Economic Relations Rejection of Cuban and non libertarian models • Public Opinion • Technocracies • Remaining Autonomous Sectors • Attachment to Private Property
67
Considering the relation between President Chavez and several political players, such as the catholic church, businessmen, opposition unions, media, etc., how should it be and how do you expect it to be in 2007?
There will be There should be
Permanent cooperation
Cooperation and conflict
24,2%
84,2%
Political players should/will obstruct goverment actions
2,7%
Unending conflict
1,0%
Government combativeness against other political players
22,9%
5,2%
9,0%
34,2%
4,0%
4,5%
Other relationships
0,2% 0,2%
None of them
0,1% 0,5%
Respondent does not know / No response
5,7%
9,5%
Basis: Basis:1300 1300
68
¿Cómo evalúa usted la labor de los siguientes sectores por el bienestar del país? (MAY 2007) Aprobación (MB/ B/ RHB) Las Empresas Productoras y Distribuidoras de Alimentos (Polar, Monaca, Cargil) La Iglesia Los Comerciantes Los Bancos Los Industriales Los Medios de Comunicación Privados La Fuerza Armada El Consejo Nacional Electoral La Sociedad Civil Organizada Los Medios de Comunicación Oficiales El Presidente Hugo Chávez El Gobierno/Los Ministros El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia La Defensoría del Pueblo La Contraloría General de la República La Asamblea Nacional El Alcalde de su Municipio Los Consejos Comunales La Fiscalía General de la República Los demás Partidos Oficialistas Los Sindicalistas El Gobernador de su estado El MVR Los Cuerpos Policiales Municipales Los Partidos de Oposición Los Círculos Bolivarianos
82,7% 81,5% 79,7% 79,1% 75,2% 72,8% 61,8% 57,0% 56,3% 56,2% 55,8% 53,2% 51,8% 51,7% 51,6% 50,8% 50,1% 48,2% 46,7% 45,3% 44,2% 42,3% 39,7% 37,1% 36,1% 32,8%
1° 2°
Aprobación superior al 80%
3° 4° 5° 6°
Aprobación superior al 70%
Aprobación superior al 50%
Base: Base: 1.300 1.300
Todas las instituciones con los más altos niveles de aprobación (superior al 70%) son de capital privado, excepto la Iglesia. El que se acerca más a este porcentaje por parte del ámbito público es la Fuerza Armada Nacional; el Presidente Chávez se ubica en el puesto 12° con 55,8%
69
In a scale from 1 to 7, how much would you say that the Government’s refusal to renovate the license of RCTV affects freedom of speech? Strata Strata Not at all
16,8%
Political Political Self Self Definition Definition
A/B
C
D
E
Pro Gob.
Ni ni
Pro Opo.
13,3%
13,4%
19,2%
16,6%
40,6%
9,0%
5,3%
0,0%
4,6%
3,9%
5,2%
8,2%
3,6%
0,9%
0,0%
3,8%
6,3%
7,9%
8,4%
7,0%
2,2%
6,7%
10,5%
12,0%
14,2%
13,4%
15,5%
3,5%
16,7%
14,2%
10,0%
10,1%
5,7%
14,0%
7,0%
10,0%
8,4%
10,9%
8,0%
4,4%
10,7%
11,4%
53,3%
42,3%
33,6%
30,9%
13,6%
34,8%
69,7%
0,0%
3,0%
4,2%
7,0%
5,7%
5,4%
0,0%
30
239
459
572
367
644
228
4,55
3,03
5,04
6,19
2
4,5% 3
6,4% 4
12,5% Promedio: 4,7
5
11,0% 6
9,2%
34,5%
Affects very much Don’t Know/No Answ.
5,1% Base Promedios pesados
© Mayo 2007 Datanalisis
5,57
5,08
4,63
Encuesta Nacional Ómnibus; 1.300 hogares; error muestral 2.72%. Fecha de campo: Del 20 al 28 de Mayo.
The Drop in Chávez’ Popularity Starting from February 2007 we have an acceleration of the revolution: “Country, Socialism or Death”. ••
••
The Thefive fiveengines enginesof ofthe theRevolution: Revolution: 1.
Enabling law (ample powers to legislate, the only existing limit is faculties’ term; one year and six months.
2. 3.
Constitutional Reform: towards a socialist state with a new distribution of power. The “revolutionary” education as value of a new society.
4.
New territorial ordering: Elevation of “endogenism (internal cause)” and atomization of the country.
5.
Consolidation of “Popular Power”, through Communal Councils. Troya’s Horse from participation.
Enterprises Enterprisesbecome becomeowned ownedby bythe theState State inin“strategic “strategicsectors” sectors” 1.
Regional Electricity Companies: ELECAR, SENECA, etc.
2. 3.
CANTV. Control of 32 oil camps changing to, mix companies with operative agreements holding the major shares of the State.
4.
Control of sales to food producer companies: Decree Special Law against the Monopolizing (Official report N° 38.628)
5.
Case RCTV – TEVES. (TV channels)
• • Pending Pendingthe theconversion conversioninto intoState Stateinstitutions institutions (threatening) (threatening) 1.
Private clinics.
2.
Private Insurance companies
3.
SIDOR.
• • The Therecovery recoveryof of10 10points pointsininJune Juneseems seemsrelated relatedto to“La “LaCopa CopaAmérica” América”
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Content
– The Implosion of the Previous Regime. – Venezuela’s Political Options – The Continuation of The Institutional Bases of the Old Political System. – The Innovations of the “new” regime –In Search of Strategies to Rebuild a Pluralist Democracy – What can be Done?
72
Flagposts for The Long Term Future
Continuity ContinuityScenario Scenario(s) (s) OIL RENT (margin of prices well over Production costs)
Rerouting ReroutingScenarios Scenarios
INCREASED
DECREASED (Imposed crash unding) Substitution of oil in word markets
–Inhibition of Private initiatives –Concentration of power –More Concentration of Power
Risk of Loss of Power
UNICITY
Centralism Statism Poverty Corruption Repression or Loss of power
Decided Soft Landing: Back to income through volume, Not prices Oil pulls again rest of economy Less rent: better income distribution
Need to Reactivate Private Initiatives Macroeconomic Equilibria
Economic Diversification
PLURALISM Decentralization Privatization Production Accountability Wealth production and distribution Democracy and Constant feedback 73
¿ Los escenarios del futuro? Precios Precios del del Petróleo Petróleo US $ - 75 B
US $ + 75 “Contra el Imperio”
Escasos Escasosvínculos vínculos con conOccidente Occidente
X
Modelo endógeno y Radical
“Entre Mano Segura y
Vínculos Vínculoscon con Occidente Occidente
Contra el Imperio” Modelo abierto Esquizofrénico
X
Usted está aquí
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* *Un Unreduccionismo reduccionismode delalademocracia, democracia,que quepasaría pasaríaaaser servista vistacomo comohegemonía hegemoníade delalamayoría mayoríay,y, por portanto, tanto,minimizaría minimizaríalos losderechos derechoseeintereses interesesde delas lasminorías. minorías.
Flagposts for The Long Term Future
Continuity ContinuityScenario Scenario(s) (s) OIL RENT (margin of prices well over Production costs)
Rerouting ReroutingScenarios Scenarios
INCREASED
DECREASED (Imposed crash unding) Substitution of oil in word markets
–Inhibition of Private initiatives –Concentration of power –Repression
Risk of Loss of Power
Decided Soft Landing: Back to income through volume, Not prices Oil pulls again rest of economy Less rent: better income distribution
Need to Reactivate Private Initiatives Macroeconomic Equilibria
Economic Diversification
UNICITY PLURALISM
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Centralism Statism Poverty
Decentralization Privatization Production
Corruption
Accountability
Poverty
Wealth production and distribution
Repression or Loss of power
Democracy and Constant feedback
Recuperate Pluralism The most significant change intended by the Revolution is the “minimization of pluralism”, not economic changes. Non Official Sectors are weak to enforce their interest, not only because of the successful strategies and tactics of the Officialists, but also because the organization-institutionality of those groups is low. Only after putting its own house in order, can anyone expect to rebuild the whole society.
Recuperation of Pluralism Starts by the Recuperation of the Organizational Strengths of Non Official Sectors: Private Enterprises Cámaras Empresariales Sindicatos Partidos Iglesias Mass Media Public Technocracies
Build:
Strong Relationships with the bases of those institutions: Avoid the demonization of the Elites: “Cúpulas Podridas” 76
Challenges of Private Enterprises
• Corporate Social Responsibility is not charity. It means to make your product or service available to as many potential clients as possible • Avoid confrontations with the government based on issues that can be interpreted as acts of greed • Separate Politics from Business • Struggle to keep Business-Government Relations Effective • Recognize the Government’s Contributions
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A Lesson on Social Change from Venezuela’s Experience
• All previous regime changes have occurred as ruptures with the past and exclusion of the defeated • The results of previous ruptures are found wanting
• Do not fight if you cannot win • Do not present a social change offer in radical terms: Integrate, do not Exclude • A Center-Left model seems to be ripe for the Venezuelan Audience • Organize a Think-Tank to handle change efforts objectively
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Positive Contributions of Chavismo Integral IntegralHandling Handlingof ofSocial SocialChange Change •Connection with the masses •Direct Subsidies •Political Education. •FAN mobilization for social purposes
Raise Raisethe theexpectations expectationsand andsituation situationof ofthe thepoor poor • Subsidies • Promotion of Micro, Small, Medium and even some Large Capitalist investments: • Créditos públicos. • Créditos banca comercial (Gavetas) • Créditos y desarrollo cooperativo.
Emphasis Emphasisininmovilizing movilizingthe thewhole wholesociety society • Political Communication • Communal Councils. • Promotion of national self esteem
Effective EffectiveCollection Collectionof ofTaxes Taxesby bySENIAT SENIAT • Maintains interdependence between Government and Tax Payers • Promotes Accountability
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Thank You!!!
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