THE INFLUENCE OF LOCALLY PRODUCED RESEARCH ON TRADE POLICY MAKING: THE CASE OF CHILE Augusto Aninat S. Mercedes I. Botto FLACSO, Argentina [email protected]

April 2005

Sector Study prepared for the Global Development Network’s “Bridging Research and Policy” Project. Draft version, please do not quote without permission. Comments are welcome.

Glossary

ALADI: Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración/ Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) ALALC: Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio/ Latin America Free trade Association (LAFTA) ASEXMA: Asociación de Exportadores de Manufacturas/ Manufactures Exporters Association BID/IADB: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo/ Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) CAN: Comunidad Andina de Naciones/ Andean Community of Nation (ACN) CAPA: Comité Arancelario del Banco Central/ Central Bank Tariff Committee CBTC CED: Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo/ Development Studies Center (DSC) CELARE: Centro Latinoamericano de Relaciones Exteriores/ Latin American Foreign Relations Center. CEP: Centro de Estudios Públicos/ Public Studies Center CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América Latina/ Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) CERN: Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Nacional/: Center for Studies on National Reality CIEPLAN: Corporación de Investigación para América Latina/: Research Corporation for Latin America CLEPI: Centro latinoamericano de Economía y Política Internacional/ Latin American Centre for International Politics and Economics. CONICYT: Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica/ National Commission for Scientific and Technological Research CORFO: Corporación de Fomento de la Producción/Production Fostering Corporation. CUTCH: Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile/ Chile Labor Union DIRECON: Dirección de Relaciones Internacionales del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores/ Office for International Economic Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Relations ENADE: Encuentro Nacional de Desarrollo/ Commission for National Development FLACSO: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales/: Latin American School of Social Studies. GRAN: Grupo Andino/ Andean Group ILD: Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo/: Freedom and Development Institution ILET: Instituto latinoamericano de Estudios de Transnacionales/: Latin American Institute for Transnational Studies JUNAC: Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena/Cartagena Agreement Committee. APEC: Asociacion de Cooperacion Economica del pacifico/ Pacific Economic Council SOFOFA: Sociedad de Fomento Fabril/ Manufacture Fostering Society UC: Universidad Católica/: Catholic University UCH: Universidad de Chile/ University of Chile UVM: Universidad de Viña del Mar/Viña del Mar University

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INTRODUCTION SECTION I: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 1. Crisis and external pressure 2. The political context and national peculiarities 3. Challenges of trade policy-making SECTION II: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR BR&P 1. Recent changes in trade policy a. The initial push (1960/70) b. Unilateral non-discriminatory opening (1973-1990) c. Preferential agreements stage (1990- onwards) 2. Institutions and relevant actors a. The initial drive b. The authoritarian period c. The return to democracy SECCION III: THE CENTRAL BRIDGING PATTERN 1. 2. a. b. c. d. 3. a.

Mapping local publications The survey analysis A portrayal of researchers and policy makers Characterization of research production The impact of research Explanatory Factors Two episodes of policy impact An unsuccessful episode b. A successful episode 4. Main features of the national pattern SECTION IV: RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Domestic level 2. International level SECTION V: CONCLUSIONS 1. Findings of the Chilean case 2. Comparison with other countries 3. Contributions to the state of art BIBLIOGRAPHY ANNEXES Annex 1: Statistical data Annex II: List of interviewees Annex III: The relation between suppliers and consumers of local research Annex IV: Data collected from the interviews

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Introduction The impact of ideas on policy making has been hotly debated. Most analysis has focused on the power and influence of multilateral institutions (Boas, M & Mc Neill, 2004; Kaufman & Haggard, 1992; Stone, 2000). The aim of this study is to understand the role of local research. This analysis will be done exploring the formulation and implementation of trade policies in the case of Chile. Rather than debating the general context, this paper emphasizes other less known aspects of trade policy: the decision-making process and the role of public and private actors producing and using local knowledge and, essentially, the relationship between trade policy formulation and the suppliers of research and expertise. Thus, the aim is to compare the positive and negative effects of research with other sources that influence trade policy decision making in the Chile case. The sources used were published works during the 1973/2004 period; field research based on interviews with relevant agents (politicians, specialists, and researchers, labor leaders, among others) and the analysis of two studies that could be considered pioneers. This report is divided in three sections. The first part describes the historical, political, economic and social context for the transformation of trade policy. After reviewing the stages, models, strategies and tactics of Chilean liberalization, institutions and relevant actors are analyzed. The second part describes and analyses bridging between research and policies based on the results of field research. Our field research consisted of: 1) collection and analysis of publications carried out during the period; 2) analysis and systemization of polls conducted among the main actors; and Identification and, 3) evaluation of two studies. One was a research paper that could be considered to have been successful in its own terms as well as for its use and effect on trade policy decisions and another study that did not have an influence on decision-making. Finally, the third section presents conclusions and recommendations on how to improve bridging and uptake of research in decision making. Two broad conclusions stem out from this study. On one hand, democratization did not lead to more pluralism and to an increasing public debate on trade. After military rule academic institutions have tended to legitimize government decisions. On the other, the arcane knowledge required in current trade negotiations creates incentives for think tanks and academics institutions to veer towards consultancy.

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Section I: Review of the literature1

Until very recently, the academia was practically a non-existent actor in the literature on policy making in Latin America. Instead, research identified other actors and institutions that influenced political decisions and grouped them nationally and internationally. On a national level, the president had an extremely important role and was above constitutional powers. A small circle of State actors (high military and bureaucratic officials2) and nongovernmental actors (interest groups) were extremely influential. On an international level, the government of the United States, transnational corporations and international organizations also were highly influential in the region (Hughes & Mejisky, 1984; Chalmers; 1972). Conclusions on the decision making process were similar. Specialists in Latin America pointed out one basic difference with developed countries. In developed countries, each stage of the decision making process was directed by a specific actor. The decision of including the issue on the agenda was made by the government, even if it was not well received by society. Governmental experts (from now on technocrats) and nongovernmental experts (academics) carried out the policy design and formulation of solutions. The presence and participation of interest groups became more important and visible during the execution stage. The evaluation stage was characterized by the synergy generated by external experts and the general public to whom the reports were made public (Cobb, Ross & Ross, 1976). In Latin America, on the contrary, the decision making process acquired an “endogamic” feature, during which the government concentrated decisions and did not allow the participation nor kept non-governmental actors in mind (Cabrero, 2000: 201). During the policy formulation stage, expertise and technical information were still handled by the State apparatus while academics and Congress had little knowledge of the issues and resources. Information was rarely disseminated. 1. Crisis and external pressure The dynamic described in the preceding paragraphs was destabilized during the periods of crisis in which both ideas (paradigms) and academic personalities took on a privileged role in policy making. This is highlighted by the ample literature on structural reforms carried out in Latin America during the eighties and nineties. These reforms were made during moments of crisis, or in the Chilean case, under the authoritarian regime, also an exceptional moment. In relation to the surge and adoption of new ideas, studies attempted to explain why democratic and populist administrations –such as Menem in Argentina, Fujimori in Peru or Collor de Mello in Brazil- adopted these reforms that, like the Washington Consensus, 1

This section was based on Mercedes Botto (2004) “La relación entre expertos y toma de decisiones en America Latina. Un análisis del estado del arte” mimeo. 2 Although the bureaucracy as a whole was never influential, some governmental agencies might have had some influence, depending on the degree of technical expertise required by the issue (Hughes and Mijeski, 1984:p. 24)

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went against their own constituencies. Application of these plans was not so much the result of the efficiency of Washington’s ideas but of the limitations of the prevailing paradigm and the failure of solutions proposed by economists and local experts to overcome the crisis (Kaufman & Haggard, 1992; Bresser Pereira, Maravall & Przeworsky, 1993). In fact, leaders did not agree ideologically with them, but understood that they would serve a triple purpose: gain access to financial aid, obtain consent from domestic actors benefiting from reforms and tie reforms to external mandates to insure continuity in time. The reason behind the penetration of these ideas in the domestic enviroment was the pressure exerted by multilateral credit organizations (IMF and World Bank), and by governments of creditor countries (mainly the United States) on whose aid the health of public accounts depended on. Conditionality associated to loans and structural adjustment plans became a channel of transmission of the new ideas and paradigms. A second group of works shed light on the role of local academics in the implementation of reforms. Although, as we mentioned before, while local knowledge and research became less important in the formulation of paradigms and alternative solutions to the precedent model, experts/academics trained overseas gained presence in the cabinets of reformist leaders. This phenomenon was linked to the effects and requirements that crisis had on the decision making process. While in ordinary times (politics as usual), public policy changes were adopted by second level bureaucrats with the participation of Congress, in “times of crisis” institutional procedures and policy styles were modified. Although these were radical changes, the adoption and implementation of these policies only involved the leaders of the Executive and a select group of aides. Congress lined up behind the leaders, delegating their power of veto until the crisis (and the perception of crisis) was overcome (Grindle, 1991; Torre, 1998; Botto, 1999). Analysis of what occurred in Latin America during the nineties generated a series of studies on the central role of academics and intellectuals in reform and policy style. The question that guided most of these case studies was why academics trained abroad, mostly economists, gained such an important role in national cabinets. Some explanations were centered on the characteristics of the profession (Montesinos, 2002). Unlike other social disciplines, economists are the only specialists trained to carry out their activities in close association with economic or political power. On account of their professional education and the job market, this professional group was the most cosmopolitan elite of the region. Also, after the crisis of the eighties, economists from all tendencies –both the structuralist and mainstream schools- became more open to pragmatism and dialogue. The competition started to decrease in favor of a new economic consensus3. Other works explained the phenomenon by exogenous variables (Bates & Kruger,1993; Gueddes,1994, among others). They argued that the purpose behind the delegation of power on technocrats in offices and public bodies (for example, oil companies, central banks) was to preserve the reform process from the typical uncertainty of politics and electoral management, ensuring their continuity in time4. Ben Schneider (2003), on the 3

The consensus in favor of pragmatism was a consequence of the pressure exerted by foreign creditors, on one hand and the acknowledgment of their own errors, on the other. (Montesinos, 2002: p. 37) 4

This isolation was seen by reformist elite as the solution to the dilemma they faced and basically consisted of: refraining demands of distribution on behalf of interest groups and patronage pressures and redirecting public investment towards long term modernization projects.

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contrary, stated that this isolation responded to the leaders’ wish to give a positive signal to investors to restore their trust and demonstrate governmental commitment with this type of reform. In sum, there was a similar regional pattern of bridging between research and decisionmaking in relation to the adoption and execution of structural reforms: • Adoption of ideas and prescription from universities abroad and international financial institutions; • Concentration of decisions on the Executive and a reduced number of advisors; • Incorporation of academics, mostly economists, to the government; • Most of them, identified with the neoliberal paradigm and strongly connected to international business echelons that benefited from the reform. Actually, it was not a novel style for the region but the reenacting of the decision making style that characterized the beginnings of the so-called Developmentalist School in the fifties. During that period, albeit under different paradigms, governments sought to modify the structure of resource allocation. Even though this development model was the opposite of the current model, import substitution and strengthening the domestic market after the War, were also external ideas and thought of by experts centered in an international institution –in this case, of regional scope, the Economic Commission for Latin America. Also in the fifties, as in the eighties, these recipes were divulged in a context of extreme economic vulnerability for Latin America caused by the closing of the markets of larger countries after the thirties crisis (Hirschman, 1981; Gourevitch, 1993).

2. The political context and national peculiarities Now that we have explained the common aspects that surrounded structural reform we will examine the differences and peculiarities between countries. The ample literature on national or sector case studies on recent reforms tended to underline the fact that orthodox prescriptions and external conditions were the same for the whole region. Nonetheless, the scope of reform was different in each country and was shaped by the peculiarities of the political system (Torre, 1991). There is a surprising number of works that studied the relation between experts and politicians in the different context of each country. Not intending to be systematic, each of these analyses tends to explain the scope of reforms in terms of rotation/stability of governmental elites. In the Chilean case, for example, Puryear (1994) pointed out that intellectuals had an important role in the transition because of its tradition of “thinking politics”, previous to the coup the etat in which intellectual and political elite were more closely related than in other countries of the region. Thus, the proscription of political parties offered social scientists an opportunity to reform themselves as well as to influence politics with a more technocratic and mediating profile than in previous stages5. However the technical specialization of Chilean economists only partly explains their rising into politics. The image of moderation, flexibility and pragmatism acquired great symbolic value (Montesinos, 2002).

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During a time in which criticism to the regime was banned, partisan intellectuals produced sophisticated criticism of the regime based on the costs and errors of policies. Political parties used economists’ credentials as a sign of renewal.

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In the Argentine case, under the developmentalist state, academics/experts conformed a social group during the fifties and sixties, which never fully became dependent on governments. The case of the Di Tella Institute is paradigmatic for it was a network of intellectuals under the wing of the Di Tella family, receiving massive international funding and only a trickle from state sources. The profile of this institution has changed over time: during the nineties, structuralist economists were replaced by a new generation of professionals trained by mainstream universities in the United States. However there remains a constant rotation of academics from the state to business and back. (Meinburg, 2003). The Brazilian case demonstrates a great continuity of the elite. In spite of having similar stabilization plans to those of Argentina, there were important differences in the relation between the intellectual and the political elite. While in Argentina, these plans were designed and implemented by high-profile personalities without a stable or solid base in political power (such as Sourrouille and Cavallo). They represent different intellectual elites6. In Brazil, however, intellectual elites involved in these measures maintained a continuity even when ideas and plans meant a break from the past. These economists inherited a national tradition, in which political and cultural powers were closely aligned, legitimizing them as the bearers of national solutions. Such intimate and organic articulation with the elite avoided accusation of being inexperienced, as in the Argentine case (Plotkin & Neiburg, 2004). 3. Challenges of trade policy-making Trade liberalization was one of the main issues of the Washington Consensus. Even though the implementation of trade liberalization was one of the areas that was most furthered during the 1985-1999 period (Lora, 2000), curiously, it had not been closely studied by scholars on policy making researchers. The findings and bibliographical contributions concentrated on the analysis of domestic reforms (such as privatization, labor deregulation and fiscal reform) in which the government’s dilemma between the need for reform and electoral interests became explicit and resisted by interest groups and citizens. The only exception to this rule was an analysis of the role of ideas in reforms and trade regimes (Niño, 2004). After revising published works on trade liberalization7, the author discarded explanations on the crucial role of the crisis, democracy and the conditions imposed by international organizations and concluded that the dissuasive and legitimizing role of ideas and the debate promoted by international organizations and American universities was extremely important.

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The author states that in the first case, heterodox economists of the Austral Plan were an outsider elite in relation to the State establishment of the time. Cavallo and those that worked with him, including Menem, also did not belong to the dominant elite for although they did have the support of business sectors these were from interior of the country and had a subordinate role in respect to metropolitan business sectors. 7

In the period between 1960 and 1979 there were only 256 new publications including books and journals that studied trade liberalization, in the period between 1980-2001, when the debate became prominent the number of publications increased by 2690.(Niño, 2004 p. 25),

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In spite of the rather incomplete analysis of actors and local processes involved in trade reform, the literature does shed some light on potential research requirements in the process of decision making in this area. Trade reform is a new issue on the public agenda of Latin American countries. Although this issue was not traditionally of special interest to governments, at present, it is a priority issue of high government officials facing multiple negotiations convinced that they are improving access to markets and that they will attract foreign investment (IADB, 2003):


In democracy, the implementation of these reforms requires the support of Congress and public legitimization. Gathering support is not easy since even eventual beneficiaries –consumers and import competing sectors- will have to wait to receive and perceive improvements (Torre, 1991).




The rhythm and pace of liberalization are highly marked by external actors. Once negotiations have started, they take on a dynamic of their own that countries can not unilaterally ignore. Sooner or later, they will have to respect commitments previously made in the multilateral framework (Tussie, 2003)




The complexity of negotiations requires great technical expertise and coordination between different governmental agencies. Negotiations are not only about opening markets and discussing tariffs, but currently include regulatory issues such as intellectual property, services and labour standards. One of the institutional characteristics of the region is the lack of intra-governmental coordination on account of the high rotation of officials, the absence of skills and presidential leadership (Jordana & Ramio, 2002)




The forums of multilateral, regional, hemispheric and bilateral negotiations have multiplied and diversified. The impossibility of responding to those requirements demonstrates the lack of expertise and public resources. This deficiency could be overcome with the help of public/private networks (Shaffer, 2003). However, overcoming this deficiency would require negotiators to make their positions public and transparent and the private sector to access expertise and resources.

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The rise of bilateral and regional negotiations has opened new spaces of informal and formal consultancies to non-governmental actors that were previously excluded from the discussion of these issues. These new actors –labour unions, NGOs, etc. demand the government more transparency and participation in the decisions of trade policy in different negotiation forums (Ostry, 2000; Botto, 2003).

These challenges could become a window of opportunity for the use of knowledge and expertise not only by governmental decision-makers, but also by old/new actors participating in the reform process. It is important to mention a series of works on methodological issues that provide instruments to analyze and eventually improve the uptake of research in the development of public policies. Regonini (1993) and Frohmann, (1999) point out that three conditions or requirements are necessary in order for bridging to take place: 1) Production: Knowledge should be translated into a politically understandable and applicable language. 2) Articulation: Mechanisms or bridging networks should be established to communicate and exchange information.

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3) Use: The will of the decision-maker to use research. From another perspective, Sabatier (1986) related the possibilities of using research to the type of changes being promoted. They distinguished three types of policy changes: first, incremental changes in the use of public policy instruments while the general thrust was maintained. Second, strategic changes that imposed modifications to the instruments without changing the objectives as a consequence of the advancement of knowledge. Third, the paradigmatic changes in which the advancement of knowledge led to changes in both the means and the objectives of public policy. To sum up, a quick evaluation of the contributions that literature has made towards bridging research and policy making in Latin America allows us to know where we are standing, which are the issues and the problems still pending and how to face fieldwork in the future. Literature is abundant in relation to the findings but is both concentrated in time and issuearea. Studies on structural reforms in the nineties followed two tracks. One aimed at identifying macro factors that allowed the adoption of orthodox ideas by fledgling democracies; and another that focused on the role of intellectuals/academics in implementation. Both tracks identified a common regional pattern referred to macroeconomic/administrative viability and the role of economists; but at the same time highlighted that specific national characteristics rendered them political feasible. As for the issues that are still pending, the literature raises three questions, which it leaves them unanswered: 1) The analysis of policy change focused on privatization, fiscal and labor reform policies, in which the dilemmas of adopting and implementing ideas were marked strongly by the pressure of domestic actors and procedures. The literature has not developed the challenges and peculiarities of trade reform. Hence we need to ask in what measure does this issue introduce changes in the relation between academia/decision? Is there a national or sector pattern of bridging in the region? 2) The literature focused its analysis on the role of external ideas and expertise, but there is no mention of local production or expertise. We need to ask what is domestic production concerned with? What type of problems and demands does local production respond to? 3) Some comparative conclusions can be inferred from the case studies in the literature. The literature however does not provide a systematic analysis with a share frame of reference for country case studies. We must now ask what background do the researchers have? Which are the main academic institutions and think tanks? How have they changed over time? These are the questions that we will try to address in this project.

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Section II: The political context for BR&P 8 1. Recent changes in trade policy The present paper understands trade policy as the combination of instruments that are directly related to export and import of goods. Thus, trades in services and production factors are deliberately excluded even though they are closely connected to trade in goods. The transformation of Chilean trade policy has been a 40 year long process, in which various objectives have been pursued and diverse instruments and multiple strategies have been applied. The policy is now installed in Chilean culture. In effect, liberalization is still backed by great export success, growth of income per capita (see Annex 1) and consequently, continues to gather support by most political and social actors and economic agents. Three stages of liberalization can be distinguished: the initial push, the unilateral non-discriminatory opening stage; and the preferential agreement stage. 1.1 The Initial Push (1960/70) The process of import substitution began to be called into question during the administrations of J. Alessandri and E. Frei (Sr) when there was a timid effort to gradually liberalize the economy. However, an unfavourable international scenario and the difficulties in reaching macro-economic balance put an end to these efforts. Another contributing factor was that the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) of the sixties petered out rather early and did not come to fruition. The next administration was more decisive. It applied a crawling peg; a gradual rationalization of regulation and promotion instruments and implemented a schedule to liberalize with a higher level of commitment through sub regional agreements either in the LAFTA frame or the Andean Group (Junac, 1976). Although LAFTA achieved some progress in the renovation of intraregional trade, liberalization was unstable and low. The Andean Group made considerably more both conceptual and effective progress in this area (Aninat, 1989). The international scenario was favorable to these policies, especially due to the Alliance for Progress and the Kennedy Round of the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT). However, the political and social context became more complex. Strong criticism to the capitalist and market system and disagreements on regional integration explain the challenges that had to be faced. Towards the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies, the country went through moments of very high tension. The left leaning Unidad Popular coalition came into power and although liberalization was slowed down, priority was still placed on regional coordination with the Andean Group.

1.2. Unilateral non-discriminatory opening (1973-1990) After the 1973 coup d’etat, the country became internationally isolated and there was deep-seated domestic unrest, turbulence and repression of dissent. During the 8

Sections II/II/IV are based on Augusto Aninat, S (2004) “La investigación y los cambios en la politica comerial de Chile: Impactos y recomendaciones”. Mimeo

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authoritarian period there were radical changes – that came under strong debate(Harberger, 1985). These changes tended towards de-regulation and especially towards a deepening of liberalization. During this long period, various stages can be distinguished characterized by a combination of different instruments and results (see Annex I). During the first stage, tariff reduction was rapidly installed for goods with a nominal-ceiling tariff of 60 percent and later of 35 percent, combined with a flexible rate of exchange. Nontariff measures and many special regimes either for the private sector or for central state agencies were abolished During the second stage, flat tariffs were gradually lowered to 10 percent and combined with a 10 percent tax refund for exports of non-traditional goods while a fixed nominal rate of exchange was imposed. This was only for a short period (1973-1980) characterized by unilateral decisions during which the government neglected regional integration altogether. Commitments were made within the GATT applying a maximum tariff of 35 percent on all imports of goods while there were a general dismantling of non-tariff barriers. When the regional debt crisis broke out in 1982, Chile had to make violent adjustments, among them, the reversal of liberalization through the increase of the flat tariff to 35 percent and the adoption of a flexible rate of exchange. Price bands were applied in an effort to isolate certain traditional agricultural products (sugar, wheat, oleaginous seeds and oils, milk) from the fluctuation of international prices. Towards mid eighties, when the economy started to improve, the flat tariff was lowered to 15 percent and tax refunds for non-traditional exports were granted. During the 1973-1990 stage there was no significant growth of income per capita or of investment. However, there was a violent change in the productive structure of those sectors with clear comparative advantages: some natural resources (fishing, fruits and vegetables, mining, forestry), services (financial services, pensions, insurance, etc.) and some non-tradeables (Scherman, 1980; Valdés, 1992). But sectors such as textiles, cars, leather manufactures, metal-mechanics entered into final decline (De La Cuadra, 1974; De La Cuadra & Hachette, 1992; Ffrench-Davis, 1983; Aninat, 1985). New suppliers such as the Asian countries made an entry. Export diversification showed great capacity to create horizontal and backward linkages.

1.3 Preferential agreements stage (1990-) The government that was elected in 1990 proposed to: i. Continue the process of liberalization taking advantage of the opportunities presented by globalization. ii. Continue the liberalization of goods while being more cautious in the case of services and the movement of productive factors (capital/labor) iii. Act quickly and give rapid answers to issues such as intellectual property, trade in services (professionals, electronic and financial services) and new international relations including labor and environmental issues. iv. Open negotiations with United States, European Union, China, India and Korea vii. Seek consensus with labor unions, business organizations and different political groups

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When the Enterprise of the Americas Initiative of Bush Sr. was announced in 1991, Chile rapidly moved to support it; when the project was delayed, Chile stepped up its efforts to enter North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and took parallel initiatives with Canada, Mexico and the European Union (Bucay & Perez Motta, 1988). Bilateral trade liberalization moved to the forefront. Chile now has a network of trade agreements that includes 42 countries accounting for 70 percent of the world GDP. 70 percent of Chilean exports are covered by such preferential agreements, a share that is expected to rise to 90 percent in 2006. Chilean exports have gone from US$ 8 billion in 1990 to an estimated US$ 30 billion for 2004 (annex I). While the initial stages of liberalization were highly debated by economists (Aninat, 1985; Ffrench Davis, 1983; Hachette, 1976), there is currently a consensus that Chile has done better with liberalization (Luders, 1998; Hainl, 2003; Morandé & Vergara, 1997).

2. Institutions and relevant actors 2.1. The initial drive The initial stage occurred in a democratic context: the Executive had some room for maneuvering and most of the initiatives had to be approved by the Parliament. In Chile there is no foreign trade ministry so this field was covered by the interaction between the Ministry of Finance, Economy, the non-autonomous Central Bank and certain more decentralized bodies such as the development bank called Corporacion de Fomento (CORFO). The private sector was organized by sector. Business chambers defending their interests in domestic production resisted liberalization efforts. As for the labour sector, a strong labour organization also opposed the opening of the economy. Economists trained both in the country and with post-graduate degrees in prestigious overseas universities became involved in the design of trade policies. Many of them were affiliated to political parties and headed their technical-economic commissions (Ramos, 1986). Schools of economics and business administration expanded and forged agreements with North American universities. Trade degrees from traditional universities became very popular. The agency in charge of making these reforms was the Central Bank Tariff Committee in which a number of other agencies participated. Negotiations within the LAFTA framework made it compelling to coordinate actions between various government agencies and the private sector. These efforts allowed the training of technocrats that acquired experience and conceptual instruments in many areas of international trade. However, the drive for regional liberalization was still weak.

2.2 The authoritarian period When the Armed Forces took over, the economy was handed over to a homogenous group of professionals, most of whom had studied at the School of Economics of the Catholic University of Chile and had post-graduate degrees from the University of Chicago. Some professionals who had held governmental posts during the sixties also took part.

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These so called Chicago Boys quickly took on the responsibility of carrying out reforms that transformed the Chilean economy and would break new ground in the region. Transformations were imposed by the Armed Forces. Neither business groups nor other social sectors were consulted about the changes or possible forms of putting them into operation. State agencies were the same as in the past, but now the ministry of Economy took on a stronger leading role and the experts in charge of trade reforms worked from the Central Bank, an institution with capacity to concentrate mildly independent professionals. Only two agencies took part in the debate on trade policy from somewhat different perspectives: the Ministry of Foreign Relations, very sensitive to the regional integration efforts and political impact in Latin America; and the so called “legislative branch” then under the full control of the military. During this period there were some institutional changes: a. The creation of Prochile, an organization that substituted precedent institutions and sought to link State policies to exporters so as to promote exports. Another important task of Prochile was to group the exporting sector to incorporate it to traditional business organizations associated to production for the domestic market. b. The Office for International Economic Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Relations (DIRECON) was set up, grouping the Secretariat for Latin American Integration and the Economic Office of the Ministry of Foreign Relations. The DIRECON relied on personnel with a strong economic background, its own budget and was very closely associated to the doctrine of the Ministry of Economy. c. Tariff policies had to be proposed to the so-called “legislative branch” by the Executive Branch in order to obtain a legal coverage of sorts. As for the role of institutions for the production of systematic knowledge, two types can be distinguished. The first one was composed by the old traditional universities, which were controlled by militaries. These universities did not carry out significant research but provided the government with personnel. The second type of institutions had been ousted from their university posts and opposed the regime. They were sustained by external funding and produced research on trade policy. The output can be summed up as strong criticism to the policy of a fixed rate of exchange as well at to the way in which the balance of payments was stabilized, to the manner and intensity of liberalization as well as abandonment of Latin-American integration. Towards the end of the eighties, these institutions became involved in the preparation of government programs for the return of democracy. The most radical opposition came from groups of Chileans that started to return from exile after the eighties, trade unions that suffered from the destruction of jobs and some environmental groups in the rise. During this period, significant changes occurred without major participation of civil society. The political and military authorities, strongly influenced by groups of economists from university research institutions that had studied abroad imposed the most drastic change. These institutions supplied the State with ministers and high technical representatives to impose reforms and carried out research supporting these reforms although only a few were published (Hachette, 1984).

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2.3 The return to democracy The return to democracy was prepared by a coalition of parties, which had drafted government programs for economic, political and social areas with the assistance of civil society, and especially private research institutions that had grown outside the controlled universities. Their documents and reports lay the foundation of operational trade policy formulation (Aninat, 1989). When the elections were won, both the directors and research staff from such centers went into office in the highest economic positions of the new administration (ministers, sub-secretaries, ambassadors, general directors, Central Bank consultants). The Ministry of Economy had a leading role in policy formulation, mainly by means of the administration of scarce resources, the constitutional limitations on Parliament and the prestige of political party leaders. The most important initial changes were: a) Presidential visits to foreign countries included trade union representatives and facilitated a favorable environment between the executive and socio-economic leaders; members of the cabinet and their advisors were invited to talk at union meetings. b) Trade negotiations were under the control of the Ministry of Finance, Economy and the DIRECON and, in less part, of the Ministry of Foreign Relations. There was even some tension about who should lead. Personalities played a role, but also, there was senses of urgency to white wash the past. c) The Presidency took on a leading role in international politics and certain ministers were granted prominent roles. Thus, negotiations with Mexico, the United States and Canada were led by the ministry of Finances, while other negotiations fell upon the Ministries of Economy and of Foreign Relations; the DIRECON never ceased to play an important part. The Inter-ministerial Commission for International Economic Negotiations was created to avoid tensions; the DIRECON was formally set up as the coordinating office. Soon after, a technical committee from the DIRECON (a technical committee) with the participation of experts from the above mentioned ministries plus sector-related ministries was set up. Towards the end of the nineties, Chile possessed a negotiating team that had a harmonious relation with the private sector. The large agenda of issues with the countries of the region and especially, with the larger powers, forced experts to become knowledgeable in other matters. The way to uptake this knowledge and expertise was via 1) regular meetings with local specialists from both public agencies or private sector, and 2) contact with international experts to take advantage of the wisdom of experienced negotiators from other countries (Van Klaveren, 1998; Lara, 2000; Montero & Federici, 1997). Negotiations with different blocs (Latin America, the United States and EU, APEC) and the FTAA agenda of issues brought about different models with advantages and disadvantages that opened horizons and created a new culture of pragmatism (Botto, 2003). The efforts to negotiate with relevant markets for Chile enforced a new publicprivate flexible type of cooperation that was not formally institutionalized. This was seen to be necessary to acquire information to deal with the agenda as well as to adapt to different circumstances and agendas. As is natural beyond the good will of business organizations

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and trade unions, there was not always a consensus; or in other cases, a consensus was not necessarily convenient for the country (Sáez & Valdés, 1999; Silva, 2001) . During this period, the presence of the private research institutions surged and for a time coexisted with those linked to the military period. Private universities grew exponentially granting degrees linked to trade and international relations. Generally speaking, less research was produced than in the latter period. A large part of the knowledge required was very operational and sought to solve narrow specific issues. The consensus on liberalization and the need for negotiations was such that knowledge production institutions were limited to going along with the process. The papers mostly focused on the net benefits of trade or on the analysis of specific information for negotiations. Opposition to liberalization was represented by a diversified minority mainly composed by the extreme left, environmental or green groups, some unions, different anti-globalization groups and regionally concentrated traditional domestic production. However, the only groups that produced systematically were the environmentalists, especially concerned with the effects of liberalization on natural resources. With the exception of the farm sector and the environmentalists, all other groups did not have enough power to veto the strategy though they were able to introduce small modifications on the margin. From then on, the demand for knowledge focused on the implementation of treaties and bilateral agreements rather than on the ex-ante impact of on-going negotiations with Asian countries such as China or India or those pending in the WTO. (Jara, 2001) With the proximity of the presidential elections due in 2006, the following challenges should be pointed out





The need to find a stable institutional formula in issues of trade policy and international relations with different options (creation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade; or under-secretaries in the Ministries of Economy or Foreign Relations). The need to institutionalize the participation of business and other agents The need to attend to the volatilities inherent in globalization The need to devote attention to relations with neighboring countries.

Both government and opposition rely on the support of technical commissions that regularly inform and advice Executive and Congress. These are formed by public servants, academics, businessmen, social leaders and expert professionals and play a leading role in the formulation of party programs (Porras, 2003). All of this would demand another type of “institutionalism” from the State; another relation with and between domestic and foreign actors, which at the same time, would generate a demand for new knowledge. Research institutions related to these topics would than have a renewed opportunity.

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Section III: The Central Bridging Pattern

A methodology was designed aiming to study the bridging process between research and policy making as well as to examine the national pattern of agenda setting. The methodology included three types of fieldwork: 1) The analysis of almost 250 publications during the 40 year-long period under analysis. These studies were highly concentrated in a few institutions and researchers. They were classified according to the nature of the research and their policy implications. Although few made major policy recommendations their influence was assessed. 2) A poll was conducted among 40 of the main policy makers to collect and systematize their opinions and perceptions. The results of the poll were then tabulated according to the characteristics of interviewees, type of research production and influence on decision making. Other factors, that might explain influence in the opinion of interviewees, were also studied. 3) Identification of two experiences of bridging research and decision making: one of these could be considered successful since it influenced public policy while the other has not yet had an influence on policy making. At the end of the chapter, there is a characterization of what we call the “central bridging pattern” between research and decision making in Chile.

1. General Features of Local Publications The decisions behind the radical changes in trade policy described in the section above do not seem to be based on local research. Rather, the decisions (on level of tariff protection, tariff structure, unilateral or preferential treatment, shock or gradual pace, etc.) responded to judgements based on the state of the art or to trends promoted by international organizations. Only occasionally have they responded to empirical analysis. The analysis of the studies (detailed in bibliography, used for section III), allowed us to examine research products by source and type of research. The following conclusions were reached (table 1): • • • • • •

Only 10 percent of local publications could be considered to contribute to general trade theories. Very few were carried out prior to the policy decisions; most of them (76 percent) analyzed policy decisions ex post or merely described the decisions made. Only 16 percent made policy recommendations, which were done on the sole basis of Chilean experiences. The policy recommendations came from few researchers and institutions; five researchers concentrate 45 percent of the policy suggestions. The dearth of theoretical investigations was mainly carried out by academics based in the old traditional universities (University of Chile and Catholic University). Research carried out by private institutions on trade was limited and sporadic. These institutions seem to have produced leading personalities rather than high-level research.

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•

The government and the private sector demand research on very narrow topics, particularly for negotiation periods and with specific agendas, such as sector and fiscal impact. The concern is to evaluate the net benefits from negotiations, both ex ante and ex post.

Table 1: Number of local works published between 1965-2005, grouped by institutional source and type of study Source Theoretical Problem-oriented Studies on impact University of Chile Catholic University Others Universities CIEPLAN CED CLEPI ILET CEP Research Institutes Others GRAN TOTAL

3 13 1 17 5 6 1 23

2 4 6 8 4 4 31 15 37

15 31 46 43 6 1 2 2 137 78 183

Differences were also identified between the authoritarian and democratic regimes:
During the authoritarian regime, most of the policy recommendations came from opposition groups. However, during the democratic period, universities regained ground.
In general terms research output from both traditional universities and research institutions declined during the democratic period. Two related reasons could explain this. On one hand, there was a revolving door process between policymaking and research. On the other, most research was carried out within the government (by in-house think tanks or by private consultants).The in-house nature of such activity reduced public dissemination insofar as findings were not shared until the implementation of the policy.
During the authoritarian period, published works were both scarce and defensive. There was a tug of war between the opposition (in particular the think tank CIEPLAN) and the Catholic University that favored the government’s trade policy.
During the democratic period, studies on the impact of policies increased, their objective was to contribute towards and legitimize decision making.
During the authoritarian period and the first years of democratization, research capacities were concentrated on a few personalities and institutions.
The analysis of research output after elections shows a fresh supply of research from new actors (such as business associations, environmental and labor NGOs and foreign private universities). Research was generally connected to the requirements imposed by preferential agreements. New researchers that had not yet held public office came into the picture. 2. The survey analysis9

9

Data collected is presented in annex IV

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Interviewees were selected from policy makers that had held public or private high posts during 1973-1990 and 1990-2004. Also, we selected interviewees that had academic production or had led a leading institution. With the aid of the bibliographical analysis, a list of approximately 40 personalities grouped by categories and stages identified in the first part of the paper They were sent an explanatory letter and a questionnaire. The questionnaire was analyzed and later corrected or clarified by complementary interviews when necessary.

2.1 Characterization of researchers and decision makers In the first place, it is necessary to point out that more policy makers (PMs) than researchers (Rs) were interviewed (17 vs. 6). However, the previous statement might be misleading for it responds to a temporal cut, since 76 percent of the PMs assert that they come from research centres while 83 percent of the interviewees said they had previous experience as PMs (figures 1 and 2). This demonstrates the “revolving doors” phenomenon in the Chilean case. As a matter of fact, for a generation, a high percentage of interviewees had rotated almost systematically in their positions as academic researchers and high level public office, either in the executive or legislative branch. Only a minority had migrated to the business sector 10..The phenomenon proves to be even more complex since many high officials had more participation in research activities (especially in the in-house think tanks) than in decision making or policy implementation. The second important characteristic is that many acquired experience in academic institutions and international organizations, not in the private sector. Although this is particular characteristic seems to have changed in other policy arenas, it has not changed in the trade policy area. As for the current positions of the PMs interviewed, three of them are now Senators and former Ministers; two of them are former Ministers; three are ex under secretaries in economic areas; quite a few were at different times former directors of government institutions related to trade policies. Other interviewees are currently managers in private firms; others are involved with the opposition parties and several are trade negotiators (figure 3).Two-thirds the Rs are in the 40 to 50 years age bracket, while 64 percent of the PMs are aged 60 to 70 years (figures 4 and 5). Most of the Rs interviewed are directors of the institutions were they currently work. Most of these institutions are think tanks (50 percent) and consulting agencies (33 percent) while there is quite a number of NGOs (figures 8 and 10). However, we must again stress that during the current period, institutions did not lead in trade research; the most relevant research was carried out by the government on a specific issue and mostly used by government officials. It is interesting to note the education and training of the PMs. Most are economists; they studied in Chilean universities and hold postgraduate degrees from overseas universities (figures 6 and 7). In conclusion, in the Chilean case, the interrelation between knowledge and strategic decisions has been led by a new class or professional group formed mostly by economists that have either been trained abroad or have international connections. Even 10

For details see Annex II. This list is confidential and is only specified so to appreciate the rank of the interviewees and not for publication.

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when they belonged to opposing schools of thought and party lines, there were pragmatic accommodations and efforts from both sides in order to allow the continuity with a paradigm whose costs had already been paid.

2.2 Characterization of research production Rs stated that a study on public polices foreign experiences and current negotiations were the most demanded (figure 9). Both researchers and PMs said that they preferred the traditional forms of reaching results such as: meetings to discuss and exchange points of view and then appointing consultants (figure 15). It is important to underline that a great deal of seminars and meetings on public polices take place in the capital city as well as in others, organized by a diversity of agents, placing the country high on the ranking of the quality of these type of conferences. The content and purpose of the publication is another important variable. Most of the studies were ex post evaluations of public policies, followed by ex ante analysis of the negotiations and negotiation cases and theoretical studies (figure 16). During the nineties there was a concern with macro-economic balance while after 2000 there was a tendency to evaluate possible impacts of the flurry of preferential agreements. In relation to the type of institutions that produced research, PMs point to universities (20 percent), followed by consulting firms (16 percent) and NGOs (16 percent), and finally, think tanks and research institutions of political parties, trade unions and business and labor chambers (8 percent each) (figure 10). As for funding sources, interviewees stated that the government and the local private sector are currently the main suppliers of resources and the most important demanders of research while international or foreign funding is not important. However, the interviewees were clear that during the authoritarian period research institutions were funded externally. Today, the private sector organizes and funds its own institutions to follow and reflect on public policies. Two reasons seem to be behind the new role of the private sector: in the first place, business is concerned with protecting its interests and, at the same time, is keen to take advantage of the negotiations. In the second place, Chile, does not qualify for vast sums of international cooperation, although some resources are expected from agreements such as the one with the EU. In relation to the issue of funding most of the interviewees agreed that the research agenda on trade policy issues is for the most part established by the government’s vision and by dominant domestic and foreign interests. Although today research issues are freely chosen, the maneuvering space for Rs to develop their own agendas is small since funding is mainly controlled by the government’s priorities and there is intense competition to get funding. Therefore, the research agenda is limited; its presentation is arranged to satisfy the needs of the government and (in a smaller measure) of the private sector, the main demanders of research.

3.3 Evaluation of the impact on decision making Interviewees concurred that the influence of research on trade policy decisions in respect to paradigm change (liberalization) has been marginal. However, they did admit that research and publications have had more influence on decisions related to the government’s

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strategies and tactics (figure 11). Researchers, on the most part, agreed with this statement, although they made fewer comments (Figure 12). Therefore, the surveys conducted seem to confirm and illustrate some of the assertions made in the first part of this paper. In relation to successful cases of how research influenced policy decision makers, PMs cited decisions such as the pace of liberalization, which markets should be prioritized; the handling of emergencies; the coordination of multilateral and unilateral efforts and general points of negotiation. Both PMs and Rs agreed that research has concentrated more on legitimating liberalization and less on the formulation of policies and agendas. Most research institutions in the 19902005 period sat on the sidelines of the liberalization and negotiation process as spectators – observers. The only opposition was found in environmental groups and labor organizations. Only the first had some research capacity, while the second have concentrated on assessing the results of agreements with Mexico and the United States (figures 13 and 14). Therefore, research on trade polices has had little capacity of influencing the decision making process. Research efforts seem to concentrate on on-going negotiations inducing legitimacy so that local actor do not oppose their implementation. Notwithstanding, interviewees had some difficulties in identifying and agreeing on a successful experience in terms of research production and its application by decisionmakers. The reasons stated went from not being able to remember a specific investigation on account of the time that had passed, to reasons such as that the findings on trade policy issues can not be credited to just one work or author. This task therefore, fell on the author and is described in section IV of this paper. From information obtained from the interviews and personal experience in policy, the path followed by two investigations is described: one that was successful in its formulation, bridging and use by policy makers and another that failed to be taken up by the public agenda. The content of these investigations and their capacity to make policy proposals is analyzed below as well as the factors that favored or inhibited their uptake by decision-makers.

2.4 Explanatory Factors On considering factors that facilitated or reinforced policy influence of research proposals, Rs focused on compatibility with governmental priorities as well as the complexity and novelty of the research object (figure 22). PMs had a different perspective on this same issue stating that what most contributed towards the use of research was the relevance (priority) of the issue on the political agenda, its objectivity and compatibility with the government’s priorities. Complexity and innovation seemed less important. The institutional and political context was another key factor in the Chilean case. Both Rs and PMs coincided in pointing out that the type of political regime has a direct influence in research, although the democratic period requires consensus and hence legitimization. In order to be taken up by decision-makers research needs to be compatible with the paradigm in place. However, in times of crisis new ideas also have chance. (Figures 23, 24 and 25). As for institutional design, researchers pointed out that a restrictive factor for research development was the high rotation of human resources, while the progressive coordination of governmental agendas was an important facilitating factor (figure 26). For PMs, however, answers were too scattered to identify a trend, although they did indicate that the expertise

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of policy makers was an important factor that contributed to the uptake in decision making (figure 27). In reference to the characteristics of the link between actors, both Rs and PMs emphasized the interest of decision-makers in research and the researcher’s credibility as a crucial factor. Meanwhile, opinions on the impact of strong lobbies are more contradictory (figures 28 and 29). Both Rs and PMs repeatedly pointed out that the factors that facilitated the uptake of research were related to the characteristics of the research, such as clarity, adaptation to political leaders’ language, the existence of consultative participation mechanisms. The different lead times required by research and decision making were mentioned as one of the factors that impeded the use of research (figures 30 and 31). One of the unexpected findings of the interviews is referred to bridging channels. By far, the most mentioned channels were personal contacts (formal and informal): newspaper articles, television programs, international networks, etc. Surprisingly, those associated to traditional communications such as publication of books, papers, web pages, etc. were less mentioned. Media development in the last few years may explain these views. However, formal channels, such as meetings, are still considered important (figures 32 and 33). The relative importance of inhibiting and facilitating factors was again confirmed by the answers of the interviewees when they were asked what measures might increase incentives to build links in the future. Researchers’ opinions concentrated on the government, the private sector and themselves. Proposals were diverse and hardly repeated themselves, except one proposing to keep an open relation with the private sector and searching for new funds (figure 34). Recommendations given by PMs focused on the role of the State: the construction of a clear and precise agenda close to everyday interests; the creation of clear tendering mechanisms; the promotion of knowledge extended to the results of investigations and their use. These opinions are critical of the system and the failure of international organizations to fund specific projects (figure 35). 3. Two episodes of policy impact To complement the above analysis two special cases of research developed in Chile in the nineties are presented. Both works are of high quality, but their influence on policy was different. In the first case, the research work was not able to influence or modify the existent policies; and while the results of the second investigation did influence policy and took on a new role legitimizing trade policies by means of research. 3.1 An unsuccessful research Towards the end of the nineties, the DIRECON decided to deepen the evaluations that it carried out periodically on the rules of origin of merchandise trade applied in preferential agreements. In response to this governmental decision, the author of the paper, a former Ambassador and head of the DIRECON under Frei’s Christian Democratic government carried out research funded by the agency. The paper had two sections. The first, highly confidential chapter was about the functioning of the processes of declaration, certification and control of the basic documents under the system. This paper ended with a document titled “Verifications to certifying bodies of the origin of goods” (2000). The second chapter entitled “The origin of goods: an economic approach” contained a proposal about the role

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that could be assigned to the system. A first version was presented at the IX Trade Policy Forum of the PECC in Seoul, Korea in 1996. The investigation developed an equation to evaluate the sustainability of current rules under the new flurry of preferential agreements. A relation was mathematically established, between magnitudes of percentages of value added and the tariff differentials. From this calculation, the investigation identified some examples and evaluated the magnitude of rules of origin to demonstrate that the existent norms had no relation whatsoever to the objective for which rules of origin had been originally designed. In fact, none of the preferential agreements signed by Chile express that rules of origin must be related to tariff differences. Quite the contrary, in many of these agreements, such norms are the same even when the tariff differentials on partners are wide (for example: Korea and EU). Drawbacks are allowed in some cases, while others do not, without studying the effect of the measure on the rules of origin. This paper concluded that the damage made by the status quo is great for Chile because of the number of preferential agreements signed. Since the supply of imported inputs was not necessarily price competitive, the paper recommended setting a differential tariff. The paper also proposed a non-cumulative rule of origin. A.Aninats sent the conclusions to the authorities and later met with them on various occasions. Although the arguments were never refuted, the proposals were not implemented. Different sectors of the government outlined three reasons explaining why the recommendations were never implemented: 1) No one submitted the proposal; 2) The proposal was submitted but not accepted; 3) It was not submitted because it was not convenient to reserve the flat tariff principle. As for the factors that impeded the use of the investigation central is breach between mid level managers and top policy decision-makers. The proposal did not easily reach those who had the necessary background and the capacity to modify policy. Time is needed to modify administration and streamline the use of economic instruments. The proposal, however, is still standing and might be used in policy discussions in Mercosur.

3.2 A successful research The economic authorities of the democratic government of the nineties considered that congressional approval would be an incentive to secure and attract preferential agreements. In the mid-nineties, the DIRECON decided to assess trade strategy with the aim of deepening tariff reduction. The decision was taken after consultations with the Ministries of Finance and Economics and basically consisted of three actions. The first was to appoint a distinguished economist from the opposition to develop a set of criteria to select markets for preferential liberalization. The second was to select and assign a group of research institutions specialized by countries (or country groups) to study the costs and benefits of eventual negotiations. An in-house group was set up to make the different approaches methodologically compatible. Lastly, the private sector was called in. To this effect, the head of the DIRECON at the time presented and explained the reasons behind these efforts to a group of businessmen. Afterwards, a monthly DIRECON Consulting Committee was created, formed by representatives of academic, business and labour echelons, seeking to exchange points of view on the Chilean strategy and the possibilities of carrying it out. The study of the Chilean scenario and the challenge of the new democratic period was entrusted to mainstream economists F. Larraín and P. Assael from the Economic Institute of

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the Catholic University of Chile. Their document “Preferential Commercial Integration” concluded that: a. Unilateral reduction systems only produced trade creation, while preferential integration opened foreign markets. Since a perfect world of free trade is not possible, preferential agreements are a second best option to eliminate protection. b. Integration with larger markets should be given priority due to scale economies, attraction of foreign investment and the level of protection faced c. Multilateralism should not be abandoned but considering the negligible power of Chile to preferential integration would be of greater value. Once the research was submitted to DIRECON, this pioneering paper was presented in academic, political and business circles. It was highly influential for it allowed making the government's strategic efforts compatible with the part of the academia that had defended the unilateral liberalization strategy during the authoritarian phase. It also received the support of business groups and right wing opposition parties that had links to that period. 4. Main features of the National Pattern This section reviews the main fieldwork findings so as to describe the Chilean pattern of bridging between research and policy decisions. In the first part we considered the main actors of the relation, identifying the links established between research suppliers and users (see annex III). In the second part, we describe how political context influenced the changes . The following features characterize the current relation between research and the trade policy process in Chile: • The government relied heavily on its own resources, research was carried out by committees and its own research departments (Ministry of Finance did the calculation of the fiscal impact of agreements; the DIRECON, the impact on exports and imports). These documents are not readily available and cannot be processed in the bibliographical sample. •

Demand for out-house research was channeled to specialized institutions (examples: negotiations with regional blocs entrusted to CIEPLAN, CED, CEP, CLEPPI) or to experts on certain issues (periodic evaluations of the rules of origin). These works are either confidential or unpublished.

•

There is a missing link between research and the national research council (CONICYT) in the case of trade policy. Funding seems to concentrate on the more traditional technological-scientific field.

•

Courses, seminars, and various kinds of consultancies mainly articulate the emerging relation between private groups and research activities.

•

The demand for research carried out by Chilean experts on behalf of international organizations and foreign governments (Paraguay: effects of the common market).

•

Chile, like many other middle income developing countries does not stand out in the ranking of expenditure on research and development, which for a long time did not represent more than 1.5 percent of the national product, a high percentage of which is State expenditure.

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In terms of changes over time it is possible to identify two main patterns. The first stages of the process of Chilean liberalization under the military were not backed by significant research but by value judgments of groups of highly respected economists with degrees from national universities and postgraduate degrees from universities abroad, very influenced by the dominant paradigms in those institutions. These economists had great political decision making power during the authoritarian period. According to the participants of the decision making process during the democratic period, liberalization was mainly sustained by sticking to the extreme doctrinaire approaches lacking pragmatism or even some accommodation of the theory to the conditions of a developing country in an extremely complex situation. On the trade policy issue, opinions are highly related to political affiliation and the experiences during this time of Chilean history. The supply of more transparent and organized research came from opposition groups that argued for a more gradualist approach, more attention to regional integration and macro-economic imbalances. However, these studies were not popular and were not used in public decisions, even though they did have the support of business groups affected by foreign competition. This type of research was externally financed. In the democratic period there is, on the contrary, more governmental demand for consultancies from within the government. During a first stage these were related to formal research institutions and later to specialists in more specific issues linked to the dynamics of negotiations. The reason is probably that in a democracy, research contributed to legitimatize decisions. From the nineties onwards, the staff of private research institutions that had flourished during the military contributed to filling government posts. Many institutes were emptied and some even disappeared. Many of the arguments on the need to avoid a policy reversal came from these quarters and had been initiated during the authoritarian period. Three policy proposals were put forth: to prioritize negotiations with large markets; to reduce the cost of trade diversion by lowering unilateral tariffs and to verify the net benefits of negotiations. The government shared these objectives. The transfer of knowledge was generated by the rotation of people that had received academic training and belonged to political parties, then held office in the Executive or Parliament and subsequently returned to the academia. Only a few of these echelons were recycled to the private sector. Therefore, the main bridging between knowledge and trade policy was based on the recruitment of experts, who with their direct participation pushed their ideas in their political parties, developing governmental programs and then improving their administration. The stages of production, exchange and use of research developed in this context. Chile seems to be a highly structured country where general ideas are exposed in explicit governmental platforms and tactics are developed according to the events that transpire. As we mentioned before, research aimed more at evaluating the impact of policies than generating radical changes. In synthesis, under democracy the role of research in Chile has not been to question policy or make alternative proposals. Instead the main thrust has been to provide legitimacy to the ongoing liberalization. Polarization has been avoided by the search for a pragmatic consensus even among opposing factions.

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Section IV: Recommendations The difficulties and challenges of institutional research are centered on its capacity to maintain a balance between politics, success and the media. In politics there is a high rotation of personalities that go into government; and once their term is over they tend to go back to research. This is especially important in the case of Chile since political cycles are quite long; therefore the change of governmental teams leads to drastic changes in personnel. The second challenge is referred to success and international prestige. There is a strong domestic and foreign demand for trade policy research and knowledge. Policy makers stated in their interviews that in order to improve policy-making both the government and the private sector must carry out research on relevant issues. However, the serious limitation in human resources to satisfy the market must be kept in mind. The third difficulty is related to the fact that traditional media channels (books, articles), including digital media (web pages, digital editions) do not reach social actors effectively. Currently, society prefers other channels of knowledge such as meetings (conferences, seminars), television and specialized newspapers and magazines. The interviews conducted shed some light on issues in which the bridge must be strengthened. The most often repeated were: a. The administrations of preferential agreements make it compelling to carry out institutional redesign in order to put order to relations with social actors. b. Information will be needed for negotiations with Asian countries as well as for the demands of regional integration (Mercosur, South American Community of Nations). In order to improve the process of participation of researchers and the academia in the deepening of Chilean liberalization, some specific domestic and international actions are recommended. 1. Domestic Level The first task that should be carried out is to make a detailed inventory of domestic institutions and relevant personalities that carry out trade policy research so as to classify them according to type, specialization and work in progress in the country or abroad (data bank of institutions and researchers). The second is to construct an agenda to consolidate the demand of the main actors for research and knowledge. It is especially urgent for the government to establish a transparent agenda defining the priorities for the period. It is important to consider handing over research that is currently carried out by government officials to private suppliers. The demand for research should be allocated by public tender by the “Buy Chile” program and the results should be publicly disseminated; it should be extended to include foreign demand for Chilean cooperation. The private sector must also establish its agenda so as to compete for resources and coordinate its work with the government if this is necessary. It is important to forge agreements with universities to finance research.

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The third task is to build incentives for the expansion of research and knowledge. Incentives might include: a special government fund with private contributions; total or partial fiscal credit for businesses that acquire local research; utility discounts for research and knowledge institutions; and different kinds of subsidies to export in services for research to which the government attaches priority. The fourth is the start up of a human resources training program including: importing human resources; private and governmental support to further education with scholarships and employment and publishing commitments and, take advantage of the available domestic capacity to provide technical assistance to other countries. The fifth is to complement traditional communication channels (books, articles) in order to improve outreach. An interesting alternative are television interviews or debate programs, even if it is cable television or interviews in specialized newspapers. It is advisable to count on an economist with communication skills instead of relying on journalists that may have other objectives. These tasks must be carried out within a competitive framework for resources since trade policy is hardly ever a priority in any society, even less in Chile.

2. International Level Chilean experience shows that it is possible to get more external resources by streamlining domestic resources in different, albeit complementary fields. •

Domestic access to external sources could be facilitated by cooperation programs in which, in the Chilean case, agreements signed with United States and the EU have explicit norms, for the deepening of regional integration.

•

Coordinating actions between countries to participate in the international research agenda of international institutions could lead to important resource savings. A good example might be the case of Latin American integration in which many institutions intervene and there is an overlapping of research as well as many gaps and deficiencies. Chile has the capacity to contribute monetary and human resources and possibly quite a few new ideas to the process.

•

Finally, Chile has more capacity than other countries to administrate and control cooperation resources made available by developed countries to the more needy countries of the region.

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Section V: Conclusions11 In this section the Chilean case is explained and then broadly compared to the other two case studies of the broader project, Argentina (Botto & Iglesias, 2004) and Brazil (Saraiva, 2004), although the results of these studies are not mentioned in this paper. Finally, we will evaluate to what extent these findings improve the problems mentioned in the review of literature. 1. Findings of the Chilean case The Chilean case sheds light on the changes in local production of research and expertise over time. The type of research produced, papers and publications by Chilean experts in the country, were basically ex-ante and ex-post papers on the impact of the policy decisions to further liberalization. None of these papers proposed alternatives to the paradigm that marked the country during the eighties, nor to the strategy, which went from unilateral to preferential liberalization. In this last case, the decision was strictly political, taken by the first democratic president and his inner circle of advisors. Papers systematizing evidence, as can be seen in the successful case, were only requested after the decision had been made with the sole objective of generating consensus and legitimacy among the affected actors and public opinion in general. Local production was concentrated on a reduced number of academic institutions and think tanks. These institutions have changed, not only as a consequence of the deepening of liberalization but also due to the relation with parties in government. The author distinguished three periods: During the authoritarian period, academic production was supplied by opposition institutions that could be characterized as political party think-tanks and formed by academics ousted from the university. With the return of democracy, these institutions were emptied as the staff took office in different agencies. The story repeats itself with the current administration albeit with two differences: on one hand, academics did not return to political party think tanks but rather created their own consultancy firms and offered their expertise to the government and to other domestic and foreign actors. On the other hand, big business began to create their own tanks. This trend shows the changing profile of think-tanks initially purely academic to a more consultancy-oriented approach. There was also a substantial change in financing. During the military regime, financing was mainly provided by bilateral foreign aid and international foundations; with the return to democracy, the government became the main funding resource being the principal demander of this type of work. At present, funding is supplied, firstly by government agencies, secondly by the private sector and lastly by international organizations or businesses. It is important to underline that the bridging process between domestic experts and decision makers happened through personal contacts and not the dissemination of papers. The main channels for the transfer of knowledge were contact meetings, the hiring of researchers and lastly the appointment of consultants. This process can be explained by 11

This section was drafted by Mercedes Botto drawing on the country case studies and a separate comparative paper

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the different lead times needed for research and policy as well as by the type of information that could be used: applied knowledge instead of original production. The use of research is clear cut: research was used to legitimize and facilitate consensus on previous decisions made by the government: Since none of the party factions wished to overturn the paradigm, changes were only limited to improving the strategy and policy tools. The factors that facilitated the use of research were, in the first place, the political regime: democratic governments demand more expertise than authoritarian regimes since more actors are included in the decision making process (Congress, public opinion, etc.). A second factor was the high rotation of officials and academics that generated trust between the two communities on account of the “revolving doors” phenomenon.

2. Comparison with other countries Is the Chilean case representative of a regional pattern or is it skewed by domestic peculiarities? The data collected in the other two cases (Botto & Iglesias, 2004; Saraiva, 2004) call for caution in answering this question. There are strong coincidences between the Argentine and Chilean cases in the production and transfer of knowledge, in contrast to Brazil. The profile of experts was similar in Chile and Argentina: most were economists with postgraduate degrees from universities abroad. In Brazil, however, professionals had a background in social sciences and most held postgraduate degrees granted by domestic universities. The second common feature between Chile and Argentina refers the surge of a great number of academic research institutions that provided and offered consultancies to the government and to other domestic actors, mainly business. In the Chilean case research was also carried out for international actors. In Brazil, however, the institutions that supplied research was mostly governmental and only a few belonged or were hired by business chambers. A third common feature is the type of financing and its impact on the diversity of research agendas. Both in Chile and in Argentina, funds came from abroad, from business or from the government. The diversity of funding sources has been a key factor in allowing some measure of pluralism during the military regime in Chile and is still crucial in a context where public resources for research are scarce. In Brazil, direct government allocations for trade policy research were not high; universities produced research that was not necessarily aimed at influencing trade policy. As the policy paradigm began to change, increasingly, foundations and transnational networks financed research carried out by social actors (labor unions, environmental NGOs). Last but not least, in reference to the way the bridging was carried out, both Argentina and Chile share the rotation phenomenon between researchers and decision-makers. In Brazil, bridging was limited, due to the lack of porosity of the bureaucracy as well the scant reliance on externally produced research. Chile is the only country in which research produced outside the government was incorporated into decision making. One of the factors that contributed was the persistence of the paradigm in spite of the regime and administration changes. Continuity allowed a

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consensus on research objectives to emerge. When there is no policy disruption the lead times between research and policy can be made compatible more easily. The Argentine case is quite the opposite. Liberalization has come under strong debate, thus hindering its continuity and the establishment of a research agenda in the medium and long term. Research is used predominantly, as in Chile, to generate legitimacy and consensus on the decisions made. However, in the Argentine case, even this function was limited by the policy volatility of successive administrations.

3. Contribution to the state of the art As stated in the review of the literature, researchers and experts with the greatest influence in all case studies are governmental technocrats and selected academics which become influential as personalities rather than because of the mere weight of their publications. Nonetheless, the analysis of the three cases allows us to speak of a gradual change in how research was incorporated into trade policy decisions. During the nineties, local knowledge was incorporated into the decision making by the recruitment of academic and experts. The need to bring in such expertise was a consequence of widespread crises, the weakening of pre-existent paradigms and the need to implement ideas and values that ran counter to visions prevailing both within the state apparatus and public opinion. Economists trained in universities in the United States and multilateral organizations implemented the new paradigm. Hence, in essence, trade reform has followed the same pattern as other structural reforms. However the trade realm has its idiosyncrasies. While in other areas of structural reform the window of opportunity was restricted to the time of crisis, in trade policy the need for non-governmental expertise remain open. A central reason for this continued demand is the constantly changing scenario. The public and the private sectors have to face problems and challenges on an on-going basis due to the flurry of negotiating fronts opened. There is, therefore, a continued reliance on experts and consultants trained abroad or with a background in multilateral organizations. The existence of local research does not in and of itself create a bridge with decisionmakers (as evident in the Brazilian case). Neither, can the revolving doors phenomena guarantee the uptake of research, as the Argentina case demonstrates. Another chief contribution of this paper was to identify and open the spectrum of the different ways knowledge production can be used. The results of research can contribute with solutions and alternatives to specific problems or further the knowledge of negotiators or decisionmakers. Also, as the three cases demonstrate, research can also contribute to improve the context of implementation of public policies, legitimizing them and persuading public opinion of the benefits of the decisions made (Figure 2).

Table 2: National Patterns of BR&P Requisites for BR&P Argentina case Knowledge production X Transfer X Uptake

Brazilian case Chilean case X X X X

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45

Annexes Annex I: Statistical Data Chart # 1 GDP growth in selected economies Average annual rates Period 1974-2003 1974-1989 1990-2003 1974-1980 1981-1989 Chile 2,9 5,5 2,8 3 Corea 8 5,9 7,1 8,6 LAC 2,9 2,4 5,1 1,3 US 3 2,9 2,5 3,3 world 3,3 2,4 3,4 3,2

1990,1997 1998-2003 7,6 2,6 7,2 4,2 3,2 1,3 2,8 3 2,3 2,5

Source: Central Bank of Chile/IMF

Chart # 2 GDP Growth in LAC during 1971– 2003 (Annual average rates) Countries Argentina Brasil Chile Colombia México Perú Uruguay

1971-1980

LAC Per/cápita Per/trabajador

1981-1989

1990 1991-1994

1995 1996-1997

1998-2003

1990-2003

2,8 8,6 2,5 5,4 6,7 3,9 3

-0,7 2,3 3 3,7 1,5 -0,7 0

-2 -4,6 3,3 4,1 5,1 -5,4 0,5

8 2,8 7,5 4,2 3,5 4,9 5,7

-2,9 4,2 9 4,9 -6,1 8,6 -2,4

6,7 2,8 6,8 2,6 6,1 4,7 5,3

-1,4 1,3 2,7 1 2,8 2 -2,5

2,2 1,7 5,1 2,6 3 3,1 1,1

5,6 3,1 1.8

1,3 -0,8 -1,6

-0,5 -2,4 -3,3

4,1 2,2 1,3

1 -0,7 -1,6

4,5 2,8 1,9

1,3 -0,3 -1,2

2,4 0,7 -0,2

Source: ECLAC

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Chart # 3 Chile: GDP Growth for export y no export-oriented sectors Period 1960-2003 Average rates in percentage GDP Periods 1960-1970 1971-1973 1974-1981 1982-1989 1990-1998 1998-2003

Exp -oriented 4,4 1,2 3 2,9 7,1 2,5

3,6 -4,1 13,6 7,8 9,9 5,8

No Exp-or 4,5 1,7 1,5 1,7 6,5 1,5

Source: ECLAC

jChart # 4 Tariff Reform in Chile ( in Percentages) Initial date

Tariff ceiling

Flat tariff

Disposition

Unilateral non discriminatory opening (1973-1990) 1974 1975 1976 1979 1981 1983 1984 1985 1985 1988

80 0-80 65 0 -65 35 0-35 10 10 20 35 30 20 15

10 10 20 35 30 20 15

DH 677/78 DH 679/81 DH 168/83 DH 746/84 DH 193/85 DH 600/85 L18687

Preferential agreements stage (1990-) 1991 11 11 L19065 1999 10 10 L 19589 2000 9 9 L19589 2001 8 8 L19589 2002 7 7 L19589 2003 6 6 L19589

Note : exceptions of price bands and not prohibition of used vehicles not included Effective tariffs reached 2,3% at the end of 2004

Source: Lexis Nexis and newspapers

47

Annex II: List of interviews

Policy Makers Augusto Economist ex ambassador, DIRECON. CED .CAN Aninat S and others. PhD Alvaro Economist, Ex minister of Economy different terms Bardón 1975 – 1990, Finis Terrae Univ. PhD R French Economist. PhD ex Central Bank, Ex CiIEPLAN, Davis CEPAL. OECD Juan Carlos Economist, Budget Director 1975 – 1980, Business Mendez consultant MA Roberto Economist ex Minister of Planning 1996-1998, Pizarro H DIRECON. PHD Ernesto Economist, Ex CIEPLAN, Director CED 1980-1990; Tironi B. Ambassador GATT 1992-1994 .PhD Sebastián Economist Min. of Finances and Economy advisor Saez 1990-2003, consulter, ex CIEPLAN. MA Experts/academics from different think tanks* Edgardo Politician. Ex Researcher CED 1980-1990, ex Boeninger Minister of Presidency 1990-1994; Senator 1995 PhD Alejandro Politician. Ex Director CIEPLAN 1973- 2000. PhD, ex Foxley Min of Finances 1990 –94. Senator 1994Roberto Businessman. President ASEXMA, Commercial Fantuzzi Engineer University of Chile Enrique Businessman. President SMES organization, Román Commercial Engineer UCH Rolando Businessman. General Manager Chilean Argentine Dávila Chamber of Commerce Haroldo Businessman, Ex DIRECON 1972 –1987; Advisor to Venegas the business sector for international negotiations Alejandro Ex manager industrial company; Seremi Economy V Corvalán Region 1990-2003; Manager of CORFO Vregion,MBA Alexis Researcher. Economist, PhD ex INE; Director Guardia Department of Studies DIRECON 2000. Sergio Researcher. Political scientist, Ex candidate to Micco Congress, Director CED 2000-Rodrigo Researcher. Economist, International consultant and Vega Director CELARE .PhD Rossana Researcher. Economist, Freedom and Development Costa Center Wally Researcher, Economist,consultant 1990- PhD. Meza Advisor at the Min of Economy 1980–1990 Diego Labor leader (CUTH); President UNT Olivares Marcel Enviromental Opposition. Economist; Ex Central Claude Bank; Director Fundación Oceanía. PhD in course

48

*Note: include experts from in-house think tanks and from outsides (business, research institutes, labor and environmental organizations)

49

Annex III: The relation between research and the trade policy process Suppliers In Chile

Consumers In Chile

Academia (Universities) Public Private

Academia Public Private

Government Ministries Conicit

Government Ministries Conicit

Central Bank

Central Bank Parliament

Specialized Institutions Associated to political groups Private Sector Business Labour SMEs Other

Labour Associations Business Labour SMEs

Specialized Institutions

NGOs Environmental Sector

NGOs Environmental Other

Experts National Foreign

Overseas Academia International Organizations NGOs Specialized Institutions

Overseas Academia International Organizations NGOs Specialized Institutions

50

Annex IV: Data collected from interviews

Previous experience as researchers

no 24%

no reply 0%

yes 76%

Figure 1. Policymakers.

Previous experience as policymakers no 17%

yes 83%

Figure 2. Researchers.

51

Policymakers' positions 0

2 3 1

1

8

0 M. of Economy Secretary Other senior positions

2

0 M. of Foreign Affairs

Under-Secretary Empresario

Others Director International Consultant

Negotiator

Figure 3

Age range of researchers 60-70 17%

30-40 17%

50-60 0%

40-50

66 Figure 4 Age range of policymakers 30-40 6%

60-70 64%

40-50 18%

50-60 12%

Figure 5

52

Field of expertise

Professional background of researchers None Others Engineer Other Social Sc Law Economics

0 0 0 0 0 0

None 1

1

Bachelor *

0

Master PhD 3

1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Number of respondents

Figure 6

Field of expertise

Professional background of policymakers No reply Others Engineer Other Social Sc Law Economics

0 0 1 0 3 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0

No reply Bachelor * Master PhD

0 2 8 2

4

6

8

10

Number of respondents

Figure 7

Respondents' positions Senior researcher 33%

Junior researcher 0%

Coordinator 0%

Director 67% Vice Director 0%

53

Figure 8. Researchers

Subjects

Subjects of study 1 1

No reply Others *4 Public Policies *3 Structural economic reforms *2 0 Foreign experiences Undergoing trade negotiations 0 0

3 1 0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

Number of respondents

Figure 9. Researchers.

Types of organizations NGOs 17%

Others 0%

business chambers think tanks 0% trade unions' think tanks 0%

International netw orks 0%

In-house think tanks 50%

political parties' think tanks 0% universities 0% consultant agencies 33%

Figure 10. Researchers.

54

9

10

5

4

5

3 1

3

4

3

None Marginal Significant Great No reply

55

4

3

2

0

0

0 Paradigm

Strategy

Tactic

Sort of policy change Figure 11

Evaluation of research impact according to researchers Number of respondents

Number of respondents

Evaluation of research impact according to policymakers

4 3 2 1 0

3 2

2

2

1 1 0

0

Paradigm

1 0

1

0

Strategy

Tactic

Sort of policy change None

Marginal

Significant

Great

Figure 12

55

None Others *1 Enlightenment Legitimise Design Policies Set agenda

0 1 0 3 2 2 0

1

2

3

4

Number of respondents

Figure 13. Researchers.

Use of research Type of use

Type of use

Use of research

No reply Others *1 Enlightenm 0 Legitimise Design Set agenda 0

1 1 8 7 5 2

4

6

8

Number of respondents

Figure 14. Policymakers.

56

Number of respondents

Impact of research activities 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

8 6

6

4

4 1

2

4 4 1

Commission of research

6 2

Hiring of academics

None

Marginal

3

44 4 2

2

Training courses

3 3

2

1

0

Academic meetings

Significant

5

4

00

Spontaneous research

Great

1

2 0

Others *

No reply

Figure 15

Main types of studies received by policymakers Number of respondents

5 4 3

3 2 0

Others

Policy evaluation (ex post) Impact analysis (ex ante)

Conjuncture studies

Analysis on negotiation strategies Theoretical studies

5 4 3 2 1 0

Figure 16

57

Types of research centres International networks 12%

Others 0%

In-house think tank 12%

NGOs 16%

Consultant agencies 16%

Trade unions' think tanks 8%

Universities 20%

Business chambers' think tanks 8%

Political parties' think tanks 8%

Figure 17

Number of respondents

Explanatory factors - Research characteristics

4 3

3

3 22 2

1

1

11

1

1

11

1 0

0

0

00 000

0 Detailed proposals

Complexity & novelty

Compatibility with gov. Lines

Others

Explanatory factors Inhibits

Neutral

Facilitates

Reinforces

No Reply

Figure 18

58

Number of respondents

Explanatory factors: Research characteristics

20 1 3 5 4 4

15 10 5 0

Complexity and novelty

Inhibits

1 5

1 6

1 8

1 6

9

9

1 1

1 0

8 0

8 1 1

Detailed policy proposals Neutral

0 2 0

Objectivity Relevance in Compatibility the political with gov. agenda lines Facilitates

Reinforces

Others *

No Reply **

Figure 19

Explanatory factors - Politico institutional context

5

Number of respondents

6 5

3

4

2

3 2 1

2

1 00

0

22 11

2

11

0

1 0

0

0

1 000

0

0 Type of political regime (Chile)

Compatibility with external paradigm

Crisis situation Urgency / priority other economic problems

Others *

Explanatory factors Inhibits

Neutral

Facilitates

Reinforces

No Reply

Figure 20. Researchers.

59

Explanatory factors: Politico-economic context

Number of respondents

20 1 5

2 3

2 4

5

8

8

5 1

3 1

Type of political regime

Compatibility external paradigm

3 0 Crisis

15 10 5 0

Inhibits

Neutral

1 5

4 7 0 Priority other economic problems

Facilitates

Reinforces

0 1 0 Others **

No Reply

Number of respondents

Figure 21. Policymakers.

Explanatory factors: Institutional configuration

4 3 2 1 0

3 2 1

3

2

2

1 1 1

1 0

Po lic ym ak er s' la

1

1

0

0 0

0 0 0 0

La ck

Hi gh

O

ck ...

int er -a ge nc y.. .

ro ta tio n

th er

s*

of po l.. .

Explanatory factors Inhibits

Neutral

Facilitates

Reinforces

No Reply

Figure 22. Researchers.

60

Number of respondents

Explanatory factors: Institutional 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

1 5

1 4 3

7

5

1 1 1 2

Lack interagency coordination

High rotation public officials

3 Policymakers' expertise Neutral

Facilitates

Reinforces

0 2 0 Others *

No Reply

Figure 23. Policymakers.

Number of respondents

Explanatory factors - Stakeholders' characteristics

4 3 2 1 0

3 22 1

2

2

1 0

1

1

0

Policymakers' interest

Lobby groups

11

1

0

1 00

Researchers' credibility

00

Others *

Explanatory factors Inhibits

Neutral

Facilitates

Reinforces

No Reply

61

Figure 24. Researchers.

Number of respondents

Explanatory factors: Stakeholders' characteristics 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

1

1 0

1

5

6

6

3 9

9 7

1 1 Policymakers' interest Inhibits

Lobby groups

Neutral

Facilitates

0 0 1 0

1 0 Researchers' credibility

Reinforces

Others *

No Reply

Figure 25. Policymakers.

Number of respondents

Explanatory factors: Format & style

5 4 3 2 1 0

4 3

3 2

1 0

1 0

2 1

0 0

Format *1

1 0

Participatory mechanisms

0 Timing

Explanatory factors

Inhibits

Neutral

Facilitates

Reinforces

No Reply

Figure 26. Researchers.

62

Number of respondents

Explanatory factors: Format & Style 20 2 4

2

5

10

9

0

1 0 Format *

1 0 Participatory mechanisms

15

2 4

5

10

Inhibits

Neutral

Facilitates

8

Reinforces

0 2 1 0 1

3 0 Timing

Others **

No Reply

Figure 27. Policymakers.

Channels

Delivery channels No reply Others: publishing Books International Research networks TV programmes Articles in newspaper Web page E-mail Informal contacts Formal contacts

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Number of respondents

Figure 28. Researchers.

63

Delivery Channels 1

Others * Books International Research networks TV programmes Articles in newspaper Web page E-mail Informal contacts Formal contacts

5 5 2 6 8 3 4 5 12 0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Number of respondents

Figure 29. Policy makers.

MEASURES TAKEN (Researchers)

No reply Others *1 Private sector *** Researchers ** Government *

0

1

2

3

4

5

Number of respondents

Figure 30

64

MEASURES TAKEN (Policymakers) No reply Others *4 Others *3 Others*2 Others *1 Private sector Researchers Government 0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Number of respondents

65